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FINANCIAL RESILIENCE AND SECURITY: EXAMINING THE IMPACT 
OF FALLING HOUSING MARKETS ON (LOW INCOME) 
HOMEOWNERS IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
Executive Summary 
This research considers the significant fall in house prices that homeowners in 
Northern Ireland experienced following the financial crisis that unfurled from 
2007/8. Specifically, the research considered what the loss of housing equity has 
meant for (low income) homeowners in the region, following a period when 
research suggested that housing equity had become increasingly important to 
households finances.  
Research and commentary about the housing market and homeownership highlights the 
opportunity to accrue housing wealth, as housing equity is considered to be a key 
resource to help smooth income or to meet unexpected expenditures, not least for lower 
income households. Since the onset of the financial crisis in 2007, homeowners in 
Northern Ireland have seen their property values halve and significant sums of housing 
equity diminish. The study finds that a minority of homeowners have been adversely 
affected in a variety of ways: with limited residential mobility, the prospect of large 
shortfall debts if they sell the property or lose their home through repossession, an 
inability to switch mortgage deals and a feeling of financial insecurity. Owning a home 
was important to people, but it was those who viewed a house as a home and not as a 
financial asset that were provided with the most succour during uncertain economic 
conditions, regardless of the sums lost. The research is based on a review of existing 
evidence, analysis of the Family Resources Survey (FRS) and interviews with a range of 
homeowners (and stakeholders) across the region. This is the first study to document the 
impact of Northern Ireland’s falling markets on homeowners. 
Background 
 Existing evidence presents the idea of resilience as the extent to which a household – 
or other agency, region or body - can independently overcome external shocks. In 
terms of personal finance, there are synergies between the qualities associated with 
the concept of resilience and asset-based welfare - where people save or accrue 
assets to draw upon when required. In the context of weaker state support there has 
been an increasing emphasis on the use of housing assets to smooth homeowners’ 
income and manage unanticipated expenditure.  
 Previous studies indicate that although housing wealth accrues more to affluent 
households, it remains the most evenly distributed asset and for low income 
households is often their only asset. Housing equity has been used to supplement 
retirement income and has been associated with meeting additional welfare spending 
through the life course. Therefore, research has posed the loss of housing wealth as a 
new risk to homeownership. 
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Key findings 
 This study has found that Northern Ireland’s homeowners have certainly seen their 
housing assets diminish and after a period of rapid housing price rises, their homes 
reduced in value by 50 – 60 per cent, losing an average of £101,388 per homeowner 
during the period 2007 to 2013. The incidence and magnitude of negative equity in 
Northern Ireland is greater than across the UK. By 2010/11, a total of 14 per cent of 
all mortgagors were estimated to have homes worth less than their mortgage debt 
and the mean average shortfall was estimated to be £35,162 (the median £18,942). 
Single people, couples under pension age with no children, those in one or two 
bedroom homes, who bought after 2005, had remortgaged and were in intermediate 
or professional occupations experienced negative equity most frequently in Northern 
Ireland and those in the bottom income quintile held the greatest estimated value of 
negative equity. 
 The housing market in Northern Ireland stabilised during 2013 but the legacy of the 
housing market volatility remains. There has been a stubbornly high rate of claims for 
possession based on mortgage arrears in comparison to the UK as a whole, where 
mortgage possessions have steadily declined since 2009; reduced mobility in the 
housing market due to negative equity; and the highest rate of homeowners unable 
to remortgage across the whole UK.  
 Northern Ireland has a greater proportion of homeowners on lower incomes and in 
lower occupational classes than the UK, where these households have to an extent 
been squeezed out of homeownership. A third of children in poverty in Northern 
Ireland live in households headed by a homeowner. Therefore, whether housing 
equity can support these households during a period of crisis and what the impact of 
that crisis has been is important to understand.  
 Interviews with homeowners and housing professionals included narratives of ‘greed’ 
and housing equity withdrawal for consumption purposes contributing to the house 
price volatility in Northern Ireland. However, data analysis showed that Northern 
Ireland’s homeowners, especially those on lower incomes, were more conservative in 
the mortgage market than homeowners across the UK, making less use of interest-
only loans, subprime loans and remortgaging. Lower income homeowners had 
increased levels of remortgaging later in the market cycle. 
 Regardless of the magnitude of housing equity losses, attitudes towards the market 
downturn rested on whether homeowners prioritised the use-value or asset-value of 
their property. Seeing the house as a home, rather than a financial asset to be used, 
offered a protective quality to homeowners in adverse economic circumstances. Those 
who had incorporated their housing equity into their financial plans, or expectations, 
were, understandably, the most anguished by the housing market downturn.  
 Homeowners who had been affected by the market downturn were severely 
hampered by their inability or unwillingness to sell and/or incur shortfall debts, felt 
financially insecure and saw limited chances of the situation changing in the near 
term. Data analysis showed that homeowners affected by negative equity were most 
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often those in early life stages of adulthood or middle aged.The interviews showed 
that they had entered complex relationships with former partners, siblings or friends 
with whom they used to live, as they wished to move on, but could not extricate 
themselves from their part ownership of property. The fear of debt for homeowners 
struggling to meet their mortgage payments also caused anxiety. Those with the most 
resources had greater opportunities to overcome the constraints the changed housing 
market had placed on them.  
 Policy implications of the study in the short-term include using the opportunity 
afforded by the Housing Repossessions Task Force to consider the extent of 
unsustainable homeownership in the region and identify measures to support local 
homeowners while sharing the risks between all parties involved: lenders, 
homeowners and government. Securing mechanisms to provide advice to those in 
negative equity and facilitate the movement of existing homeowners within the 
market would alleviate the feeling of ‘life on hold’ for many homeowners, and 
limited the impacts of the market downturn on residential mobility. 
 
 In the longer term, the use-value of homeownership should be reasserted, and 
solutions to constrained funding based on utilising individual homeowners’ housing 
equity avoided. Housing equity is unevenly distributed suggesting people with more 
wealth or in certain locations have access to greater services, and public policy 
becomes skewed by the requirements to support the housing market. Moreover, such 
measures have the potential to undermine the values associated with 
homeownership that people suggest are important, notably security and control. 
Nevertheless, homeowners are sitting on large sums of, largely unearned, housing 
assets that could be usefully deployed to support public policy, but can only be 
equitably accessed by reform of land and housing taxation. 
 
 Lastly, the study demonstrates that homeownership includes low income households, 
some of which are below the poverty threshold. A third of children in poverty in 
Northern Ireland reside in households headed by a homeowner. Although any 
housing wealth may be of limited use in practice for these households, as it is smaller 
and hard to release, there are implications for poverty alleviation strategies, not least 
area-based initiatives that may not capture a significant portion of struggling 
households if tenure is not considered.  
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1: INTRODUCTION 
This report examines the significant fall in house prices in Northern Ireland since 2007 
and, following a period when housing equity had become increasingly important to 
household finances, considers what the loss of housing equity has meant for homeowners 
in the region. There is a focus on lower income homeowners as the importance of 
housing equity and the opportunities it is said bring to homeowners has been a central 
tenet of policy support for the expansion of homeownership.  
The housing market in Northern Ireland has experienced unprecedented house price 
volatility over the last decade and the impacts of the recent fall in house prices for 
homeowners remain largely unexamined. Northern Ireland’s housing market fell 50-60 
per cent between 2007 and 2013, and in 2013 house prices were below their 2004/5 
values. The consequences of the falling housing market will be felt by many people, 
institutions and businesses and in multiple ways, including directly through negative 
equity or indirectly through the wider impact on the region’s economy. This report is 
concerned with one aspect of the significant housing market downturn in the area:  the 
impact of the loss of housing wealth on individual homeowners. During the housing 
market upswing, homeowners increasingly incorporated housing wealth into their 
financial plans and, consequently, the removal of housing wealth has been positioned as 
a new risk to homeownership. Substantial resources previously available to homeowners 
throughout the life course have reduced or become inaccessible as house prices have 
declined sharply and mortgage markets contracted. In this context, the report considers 
the impacts of the housing market readjustment specifically on lower income 
homeowners, for whom housing wealth has frequently been their only asset.  
Specifically, the research explores the potential and limits of asset-based welfare policies 
for Northern Ireland homeowners following the financial crisis. Globally, if mortgage 
markets permit, homeowners have increasingly considered their home as a financial 
asset, deployed to repay debt, fund home improvements or one off items, provide a 
deposit for children to enter homeownership or used to supplement retirement income. 
Moreover, homeowners derive significant psycho-social benefits from the accumulation of 
housing assets, which enhances feelings of security and financial resilience. Claims are 
also made for the potential of homeownership to overcome poverty in lower income 
households. All of which suggests that a weakening of the asset values of people’s homes 
could prove to be financially de-stabilising for homeowners over the long term, not least 
for lower income households.  
The Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister has funded the Centre for 
Housing Policy at the University of York to undertake this study. This research will inform 
its Equality and Social Need Research Programme and provide support to the Executive in 
fulfilling its goals. A key ambition of the programme is to understand the extent, 
distribution and causes of inequality and the impacts of policies pursued to address 
disadvantages in order to  support the delivery of the ‘Lifetime Opportunities’ anti-
poverty strategy. Whilst building pathways to employment is a fundamental way to 
overcome deprivation and disadvantage, as identified in the Social Investment Fund 
initiative, another widely debated dimension to overcoming disadvantage has been the 
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opportunity to widen participation in the accumulation of assets and wealth, in particular, 
housing wealth.  
Paxton (2003:1) notes that the ‘stocks of wealth that an individual holds and not just their 
income or consumption should be seen as important when assessing their wellbeing’. Such 
arguments reflected a growing interest in asset-based welfare over the last decade, 
whereby individuals develop their own resources through savings, or other asset 
holdings, in order to smooth income fluctuations and increase self-reliance. Some hold 
strong ideological commitments to asset ownership amongst poorer households as an 
alternative to income maintenance policies and ‘dependency’ (see Wind-Cowie, 2009; 
Greenhalgh and Moss, 2009). Appleyard and Rowlingson (2011) concur that both income 
and assets are important when investigating economic inequalities, as housing assets are 
the most evenly distributed asset class and constitute 39 per cent of all net wealth.  And 
yet there is much to learn about how people utilise the wealth stored in their home, and 
how spatial variations in housing markets may influence a person’s appetite for using 
their housing wealth. We do know that younger cohorts of homeowners in later life are 
more open than current older homeowners to using the money stored in their home 
(Rowlingson, 2005), although generally, people derive profound security from acquiring 
the asset, so spending their home is the last resort (Jones, 2007).  
Over the period 1994 to 2004 homeownership in Northern Ireland increased from 64 
per cent to 73 per cent (DCLG Live Table 108, source NI DSD) and remains the dominant 
tenure despite falling back from this peak to 67 per cent by 2011 (NISRA, 2012). 
Alongside tenure changes, the Northern Ireland housing market has also witnessed rapid 
rises and falls in local house prices over the last decade. The scale of Northern Ireland’s 
house price decline has been greater than in any other part of the UK, falling 38 per cent 
by 2011 (Figure 1.1). Moreover, prices continued to fall and by 2013 were some 50-60 
per cent below the 2007 market peak, a similar magnitude of house price falls to the 
Republic of Ireland, and greater than other European countries or the United States 
(Figure 1.2). 
Figure 1.1: Percentage change in mix adjusted house prices by UK region (2007 to 2011)  
 
Source: Department of Communities and Local Government Live Table 507 
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Figure 1.2: Percentage changes in Hypostat house price index 2007 to 2012 
 
Source: Hypostat 2013 European Mortgage Federation 
Property values in London have recovered their peak levels and are now subject to over-
heating, but although the market now appears to have ‘bottomed out’ or stabilised in 
Northern Ireland house prices remain well below their values in 2007 (Bridie, 2013). 
Moreover, the Financial Services Authority (FSA, 2012) estimated that 35 per cent of 
mortgages taken out after 2005 in Northern Ireland were in negative equity, again the 
highest proportion in the UK.  
The readjustment in Northern Ireland’s housing market may be welcome for those 
entering homeownership for the first time, as prices are more attuned to local incomes, 
and lower house prices mean saving for a deposit is more achievable. Certainly, despite 
fewer transactions, the proportion of the market occupied by first time buyers has been 
high, around 59 per cent in 2012, up from a low of 32 per cent in 2007 (Council of 
Mortgage Lenders Table ML2). This compares to an average market share for first time 
buyers of 45 per cent for the UK as a whole (CML, 20141). However, the wider economic 
context remains fragile in Northern Ireland as the economy is not expected to recover 
from the impacts of the recession until after the rest of the UK (Murphy, 2012). Indeed, 
the GVA per head – the measure used to reflect economic productivity in different 
locations- in Northern Ireland fell 10 per cent between 2008 and 2013 compared to the 
UK where it fell only 5.8 per cent and only 3.3 per cent in the South East of England 
(Plunkett et al., 2014). Moreover, when the full impact of welfare reforms are felt 
research posits that a total of £750 million will be removed from the Northern Ireland 
economy; a greatest financial loss per working age adult than anywhere in the United 
Kingdom, with Belfast the worst affected city (Beatty et al., 2013). During the period of 
the market downturn, household incomes, poverty rates and the labour market have all 
deteriorated in Northern Ireland and to a greater extent than in Great Britain (New Policy 
Institute, 2014). More positively, the Northern Ireland Composite Economic Index 
recorded a 1.2 per cent growth between Q3-2012 to Q3-2013, and stronger growth in 
the private sector between Q2 and Q3-2013 of 2.2 per cent (NISRA, 2014a). In this 
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climate there has been a halt to the decline in the local housing market but it is uncertain 
how the economy and housing market will fare in the future. 
Undoubtedly, the impact of the financial crisis on housing and mortgage markets has 
been profound; Williams (2011:55) suggests ‘The credit crunch has changed the UK and 
will go on changing it’. House prices have fallen and absolute housing equity for owners 
will have diminished, or become negative, leaving many with fewer resources on which to 
draw. In addition, mortgage market constraints render what equity that remains less 
fungible than prior to the crisis. Furthermore, a more prudent mortgage market following 
tighter regulation and the need for banks to re-capitalise will mean less of the stimulus to 
the housing market recovery that followed the last UK housing market recession, when 
liberal access to credit markets contributed to house price growth. Limits on access to 
housing assets due to falling house prices and mortgage constraints, especially in the 
context of increased welfare needs and declining state provision, may have important 
implications for welfare, as a source of financial support for some households has been 
removed (Parkinson et al., 2009; Toussaint and Elsinga, 2009). Paradoxically, further 
retrenchment or reconfiguration of the welfare state may also prompt a greater reliance 
on a household’s own resources and individual capacity to withstand income shocks.  
Research aims and objectives 
The main aims of the research were to examine: 
 The extent and use made of housing equity in Northern Ireland by lower income 
households 
 How the use of equity may have changed following the financial crisis 
 How the loss of equity has impacted on the financial security and well-being of 
homeowners and their family members  
 How the loss of equity in recent years may have influenced these households’ 
financial planning  
 What the possible policy implications of the loss of personal wealth of Northern 
Ireland homeowners might be in the future. 
Specific research objectives included the following: 
 Identify wealth inequalities in Northern Ireland and the role of housing assets in 
mitigating any disparities 
 Identify the extent of housing equity gains made and/or lost for different Northern 
Ireland households 
 Examine how housing equity has been used, by whom and what for and with what 
consequences prior to the market downturn 
 Examine the importance of housing equity to lower income households’ financial 
security, expectations and planning. What role did homeowners attribute to 
housing equity in smoothing income fluctuations, securing housing for younger 
family members, funding university places, pension provision and care in later life, 
for example, prior to the market fall? 
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 Assess the impact of the housing market collapse on the financial security, 
circumstances and planning of different groups and age cohorts of homeowners 
now and in the future 
 Examine how lower-income homeowners have reviewed their finances to account 
for the loss of personal wealth.  How have savings rates or other asset holdings 
such as pensions been affected? How have homeowners revised their financial 
plans or expectations? 
 Examine the potential consequences for the state – e.g. in terms of welfare 
benefits, social care costs, long term care and housing - of lower income 
households having fewer private resources on which to draw in the future.  
 Examine how lower-income homeowners view their future needs in the context of 
lower housing equity 
Research Methods 
The research adopted a range of methods to achieve its objectives. These comprised;  
 A literature review 
 Quantitative data analysis of statistical datasets 
 Qualitative interviews with lower-income homeowners, and  
 Qualitative interviews with policy makers and other key housing stakeholders.  
Literature review 
The literature review provides the context to the research, providing an overview of the 
role housing wealth may take as a component of financial resilience and its potential and 
limitations in overcoming poverty. Moreover, the review of data sources provided an 
overview of Northern Ireland’s housing market.  
In-depth qualitative interviews  
A total of 61 qualitative interviews have been undertaken, 10 with housing market 
and/or policy stakeholders and a total of 51 interviews with a range of homeowners 
across Northern Ireland who had purchased their home up to 2007. The focus was on 
lower income homeowners, although higher income homeowners and homeowners who 
had used affordable homeownership options were included for comparison (Table 1.1).  
Most of the homeowners were recruited using a local market research company, 
although five were obtained through a local advice service and housing agency, as the 
impacts on those with negative equity were under-represented. Participants were 
identified on the basis of the following attributes: 
 Lower income- defined by the bottom two quintiles of equivalised household 
income 
 Higher income – defined by the top two quintiles of household income 
 Location- participants were drawn from across Northern Ireland to reflect any 
differences in local housing markets 
 Age- to capture participants throughout the life course 
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 Affordable homeownership- including NIHE House Sales scheme or Co-
Ownership. Such schemes have been positioned as potentially risk-reducing and 
these purchasers may have had different experiences to other homeowners. 
 
The interviews with homeowners were undertaken by telephone between July 2012 and 
January 2013. Digital recordings and notes were made during the conversation and 
typed up after the call.  Participants were given a £20 shopping voucher as an incentive 
and to thank them for participating in the research. Interviews with housing market 
stakeholders were a mixture of face-to-face and telephone interviews and were 
undertaken between March 2012 and September 2012. Four follow up interviews were 
held with stakeholders in Autumn 2013 to capture any changes during the intervening 
period. 
Topic guides were used for the in-depth interviews to guide the conversation and covered 
assessments of the period leading up to the market collapse, how this affected individual 
and institutional behaviour; if and how equity was withdrawn and used; the impact of the 
market fall on financial security now and their views on the longer terms impacts.  The 
topic guide used for homeowners is shown in Appendix 1.  
Quantitative data analysis 
The quantitative data analysis is based on the Family Resources Survey (FRS). The FRS is a 
Government survey of a nationally representative sample of UK households. It is a 
continuous survey, launched in 1992, that currently has a target sample size of 24,000 
households per financial year, with approximately 3,000 in Northern Ireland. For the 
purposes of this research, analysis of the FRS was focussed on the most recent nine years 
of data available when the study commenced, from 2002/03 to 2010/11. The FRS is a 
particularly useful resource for this research, since it is relatively large in scale, and 
provides a consistent data source across the entire UK. Alternative datasets such as the 
Wealth and Assets Survey are confined to Great Britain.  
Table 1.1: Selection of homeowners interviewed 
All households 
homeowners prior to 
2007 
Lower income 
homeowners 
Subsidised 
homeownership 
Higher 
income 
homeowners 
Total 
25-35 40-50 60+ 
Any age 
Any age House 
Sales 
Co-Owner 
ship 
East Region 
South Down 
Newcastle/ Downpatrick  
6 1 2 1 1 3 14 
West Region 
Fermanagh/South 
Tyrone 
Omagh/Enniskillen 
4 6 1 1 1 
4 
 
17 
Belfast 
Local authority district 
5 3 6 1 1 4 20 
Total 15 10 9 3 3 11 51 
Grand Totals 34 6 11 51 
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The nine years were divided into three groups of three years to explore changes in the 
owner occupied housing in terms of three housing market stages, which were identified 
through analysis of the house price index of the Halifax Bank, and the house price index 
produced by the University of Ulster. The three market stages are: 
 2002/03, 2003/04, 2004/05: Rising market 
 2005/06, 2006/07, 2007/08: Peaking market 
 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11: Falling market 
The FRS data was re-weighted using calculations based on the existing annual weights 
within the data to produce nationally representative estimates for each of the three 
market stages. The result is that figures, percentages, and household counts produced in 
this analysis are effectively three-yearly averages for each market stage.  
Equivalisation was used in the analysis of household incomes, involving either before or 
after housing costs incomes. Equivalisation adjusts household incomes based on the 
notion that a larger household requires a larger income to achieve a similar standard of 
living as a smaller household. The OECD modified equivalence scale has been used - the 
scale currently preferred in Government analyses - that allocates values for each adult, 
each child aged 0-13, and each child aged 14-18 within a household. This scale 
effectively allows household incomes to be compared with the reference category of 
childless couples (as childless couples have an equivalence value of 1.0), as set out in 
Table 1.2. 
Table 1.2 : The OECD modified equivalence scale 
Household members BHC (OECD modified scale) AHC (Companion scale) 
HRP/HoH 0.67 0.58 
Each extra adult 0.33 0.42 
Each child aged 0-13 0.20 0.20 
Each child aged 14-18 0.33 0.42 
 
The FRS records the year of purchase and the property purchase price for mortgagors 
(only). These two variables in conjunction with the Halifax all properties UK house price 
index and the household’s self-reported total mortgage debt outstanding were used to 
estimate the level of negative equity existing at the time a household was interviewed in 
the Survey. The Halifax indices started in 1983, meaning that the estimates of negative 
equity could only include mortgagors who had purchased their home from that year 
onwards (about four per cent of mortgagors were excluded due to them having bought 
their home prior to 1983). For mortgagors who had purchased from 1983 onwards, the 
original purchase price of their homes was inflated using the Halifax index to give an 
estimate of their value at the time they were interviewed in the FRS. The outstanding 
mortgage debt was then deducted from this estimate to give an estimate of the extent 
and size of negative equity amongst this group of home owners. 
Structure of the report 
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The report continues by providing an overview of the literature on the role housing assets 
can play in strengthening resilience through asset-based welfare policies (Chapter 2). 
Chapter 3 examines the Northern Ireland housing market. Chapter 4 draws on the 
Family Resources Survey to present a profile of homeowners in Northern Ireland, how 
they have used mortgage finance and how their equity has changed during the market 
cycle. The following chapter (Chapter 5) draws on the in-depth interviews with 
homeowners to examine their perceptions of housing market change and the impacts on 
individual homeowners. The last chapter (Chapter 6) highlights some key findings and 
discusses the implications of the research. 
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2: FINANCIAL RESILIENCE AND HOUSING ASSETS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The development of financial and housing assets among lower income households has 
been a significant theme in international literature. The benefits said to derive from the 
accumulation of housing wealth have informed the discourse or rhetoric attached to 
policy shifts towards self-provision to overcome adversity rather than public endeavours. 
This chapter outlines what is meant by the terms resilience and asset-based welfare and 
provides an overview of the arguments surrounding the potentially transformative 
qualities of housing wealth in terms of personal financial planning.  
Resilience  
The concept of resilience is used widely in a range of policy contexts - including 
psychology, military security and terrorism, financial organisations, ecology, climate 
change or developing regional economies in global markets - but its meaning is 
malleable, rendering it able to transcend different domains (MacKinnon and Derickson, 
2012; Davoudi, 2012; Walker and Cooper, 2011). Resilience is commonly used to 
encapsulate qualities within complex systems, organisations, communities - or even 
households and individuals - that can resist or successfully adapt to significant external 
shocks.  The term comprises processes such as the ability to rebound, adapt and/or 
recover and is currently popular as it reflects contemporary concerns with insecurity and 
uncertainty (Christopherson et al., 2010).  
The concept can be problematic as focussing on resilience arguably places the onus on 
individuals and communities to secure their future independently, in the face of, for 
example, globalisation and economic change, when they may not have the resources or 
power to do so (MacKinnon and Derickson, 2012). Ben-Gallim and Lanning (2010) found 
that households’ indebtedness was a function of the resilience of the industry in which 
Summary 
 Resilience in terms of personal finance is the extent to which a household can 
manage a loss of income or unexpected expenditure alone, or require public 
assistance. 
 There are synergies between the qualities of resilience and asset-based 
welfare, where people save or accrue other assets to draw down when 
required or that can be deployed to access opportunities otherwise 
unavailable.  
 More housing wealth accrues to the highest income households but remains 
the most equally distributed asset class.  
 Housing equity has been used across the income spectrum, not just in later 
life to supplement retirement income, but to support additional expenditure 
during the life course, for welfare associated needs as well as consumption.  
 The loss of housing wealth has been posed as a new risk to homeownership.  
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people are employed, over which they have no control, rather than individuals’ personal 
qualities and money management skills.  While the interest in resilience reinforces 
people’s agency, it also fails to account for power imbalances that limit the ability to 
‘bounce back’ (Harrison, 2013). Walker and Cooper (2011) draw parallels between 
market-based philosophies and the concept of ‘resilience’ that accepts the organisation 
of the world is given and beyond public intervention. Moreover, Davoudi (2012) also 
finds synergies between neoclassical economic interpretations of resilience forged on 
self-reliance, minimal state support and returns of systems to equilibrium. These 
approaches often demand emergency measures to return the system to ‘normal’, and 
omit to acknowledge that previously normal practices may have been culpable in the 
shock, weaknesses or crises, suggesting a ‘new normal’ may be desirable (ibid.).  
Nonetheless, other conceptualisations of resilience illustrate that a range of resources 
can be brought to bear to manage, or recover, from the adverse impacts of external 
shocks, and these may be at different levels: structural, cultural, systemic, coping, 
relational as well as individual (Cardenas and Lopez, 2010). Implicit in this perception –
and in evolutionary non-equilibrium interpretations of resilience - is that multiple actors 
and agencies may also have responsibilities to increase the capacity of systems, 
organisations or people to manage and respond to disruptions over the long-term 
(Davoudi, 2012).  
Although the concept of ‘resilience’ has been widely applied to regional economies and 
the organisational capacity of financial institutions to withstand future systemic shocks in 
the wake of the financial crisis, the term has been infrequently applied to personal 
financial management or individual economic circumstances. This report adopts the term 
to consider how individuals and households are able to respond to the effects of the 
financial crisis now and in the future, by their deployment of their own personal 
resources, highlighting what further support they may require to secure their own future.   
Asset-based welfare 
The concept of resilience, if understood in a limited sense of an individuals’ preparedness 
to resist or recover from crises, is analogous with the discourse surrounding asset-based 
welfare. Asset-based welfare suggests that people can, through the accumulation of 
assets rather than additional income alone, increase their self-reliance and their ability to 
smooth income shocks, provide a financial cushion for households, increase self-efficacy 
and control and stimulate the growth of other assets, such as social and human capital 
(Sherraden, 1991). Some are explicit about the link, for example, Dolphin (2012) 
examined how enhancing savings behaviour and creating opportunities for asset 
accumulation for lower income young people can secure their financial resilience. This 
approach, as in the first conceptualisation of resilience above, makes individuals 
responsible for their own financial risk in society. Rowlingson and McKay (2012) note that 
the shift towards personal assets and away from collective welfare began from the 1980s 
onwards and has appeal for a wide spectrum of politics, by seemingly addressing 
inequality and making poorer people self-reliant (see Maxwell and Sodha, 2005; Wind-
Cowie, 2009).  Sherraden is enthusiastic about the role of governments or community 
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agencies fostering opportunities for asset-accumulation so does concede that multiple 
players will be involved in supporting individuals. 
Governments have adopted different models of asset-based welfare policies, notably the 
Individual Development Accounts in the USA, which are match funded savings accounts, 
which can be used for various uses including as a deposit to purchase a home, post-
secondary education or business start-ups, and occasionally other goods (Sherraden, 
1991).  The 1997-2010 Labour Government in Westminster embraced the ideas of asset-
based welfare and introduced savings mechanisms to encourage asset building among 
lower income households, such as the Savings Gateway and Child Trust Bonds 
(Prabkahar, 2009). These were explicit policies, but de facto asset-based welfare policies 
were also associated with the promotion of homeownership, where subsidised access to 
homeownership was provided, in part, to extend the opportunities for asset-accumulation 
to lower-income groups (ODPM, 2005). Arguably, these interventions to support 
homeownership also operated on a much wider scale than the other initiatives. 
Moreover, although the UK Coalition Government from 2010 abolished the Savings 
Gateway and Child Trust Bonds, the support for homeownership in Westminster remains 
strong (DCLG, 2011). Similarly, the commitment to homeownership and subsidising 
access to homeownership through the Co-Ownership and House Sales schemes has also 
been maintained in Northern Ireland (Semple, 2007) and accessing and sustaining 
homeownership locally are two of the three key areas that form the focus of the Northern 
Ireland Housing Strategy (DSD, 2013).  
Discussions of homeownership and housing wealth have become increasingly important 
in many countries and as Forrest (2008) notes: 
“…in the global scheme of things, home ownership has become an important dimension of an 
economic citizenship in which those with housing assets can enhance earned income directly and 
indirectly to sustain consumption, lifestyles and social status and are often better placed to 
weather adverse economic circumstances.” (p.172). 
What researchers have called an ‘asset-effect’ is evident, as regardless of other 
attributes, having savings early in adulthood has an independent and positive influence 
on earnings and employment later in life (McKnight, 2011). While financial assets are the 
most unequally distributed, housing assets are more widely held and represent a greater 
share of all wealth (Bastagli, 2012). 
Housing wealth 
Undoubtedly, in the period prior to 2007, when the financial crisis began, homeowners 
accrued significant sums of housing equity. At the peak of the market in 2007, UK net 
housing equity equalled £2.89 trillion, dropping back only marginally to £2.79 trillion by 
2010 (Wilcox and Pawson, 2012). As with stocks and shares, housing wealth is unevenly 
distributed across the income spectrum, but remains the most widely held asset class, and 
for many lower-income households represents their only form of wealth (Rowlingson and 
McKay, 2011).  Typically greater gains do accrue to wealthier homeowners (Bastagli, 
2012; Burridge, 2010; Hamnet, 1999). Moreover, Belsky et al. (2003) found that US low 
income homeowners accumulated wealth at a slower pace as they have shorter stays in 
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homeownership, are less likely to chase the best interest rates and benefit less from tax 
breaks in comparison to affluent owners.   Pryce and Sprigings (2009) note that for lower 
income homeowners in the UK, their timing of entry in relation to market cycles, shorter 
periods of homeownership and greater volatility in the lower ends of the market may 
have deleterious effects on the relative gains of homeownership for some social groups.  
Nonetheless, many low to middle income households also made, often substantial, equity 
gains prior to the financial crisis in 2007. Indeed, Thomas and Dorling (2006) noted 
growing inequalities arising from the differential performance of local housing markets, 
suggesting that this accumulation of housing equity affords some homeowners the 
opportunity to transcend inequalities generated by the labour market. While this spatial 
variation generates inequalities within homeownership, of significant concern are the 
cleavages housing wealth has exposed between those with equity (homeowners) and 
those without (renters) (Forrest, 2008; Stephens, 2011; Stephens and Williams, 2012). 
Moreover, intergenerational disparities occur as wealth increasingly accrues to older 
generations and inequalities are perpetuated, as home-owning parents increasingly 
support children into the tenure and strengthen the relationship that exists between 
homeownership and educational attainment (Hills et al., 2013).  
As noted above, the transformative quality of housing wealth is contingent on housing 
markets, mortgage products and the risks and processes associated with liquidising 
housing assets. Writing in the early 2000s, Burrows (2003) suggested that capital assets 
remain unavailable to homeowners in their lifetime, but since that time housing equity 
has become more fungible.  During the period of rising markets up to 2007 homeowners 
became aware of the financial benefits arising from their home, and the financial 
products that help them unlock housing equity, and incorporated housing equity into 
their financial planning during the life-course or in retirement (Watson, 2009; Smith and 
Searle, 2008). The propensity to utilise housing equity, however, varies across countries 
as institutional arrangements prompt different attitudes and behaviours towards spending 
money stored in a person’s home (Toussaint, 2011). Comparative research is therefore 
important in assessing the potential of housing wealth.  
Homeowners can withdraw equity from their homes in many different ways; during 
housing market transactions by over-mortgaging, taking out a larger mortgage than is 
required to fund the purchase; last-time sales, when homeowners die or exit 
homeownership; when developers sell a new or vacant property or by trading down; or in 
situ- by taking out further advances or second loans or over-mortgaging (Reinold, 2011).   
Equity withdrawal by over- or remortgaging became a substantial part of the mortgage 
market prior to the financial crisis from 2007 (Smith, 2004). Parkinson et al. (2009) found 
using longitudinal data in Great Britain and Australia that housing equity appeared to 
have become an important welfare-related resource as equity withdrawal was associated 
with critical life events, such as the birth of children, household dissolution and 
unemployment, as well as consumption and home improvements. Ong et al. (2013) 
indicate that withdrawing equity was associated with a range of financial distress and that 
the most common method, used by18 per cent of households, is to borrow equity in situ 
by increasing the mortgage, releasing £80 billion to the UK economy. Indeed, using the 
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same data, Searle (2010) found that borrowing against the equity stored in the home 
was associated with increased risks of repossession. Moreover, secondary borrowing and 
remortgaging was an important feature of the biographies of borrowers exiting 
homeownership because of mortgage arrears and had complicated the management of 
mortgage default for borrowers and lenders (Wallace et al., 2011; Wilcox et al., 2010). 
Evidence suggests then that whilst housing equity can be a useful resource to draw on at 
critical times, there are negative risks associated with using housing wealth in this way. 
Older homeowners who have repaid their mortgages can avoid poverty in later life 
because of the minimal housing costs associated with outright ownership (Stephens et al., 
2010; Tunstall et al., 2013).   Older homeowners may also access the wealth stored in 
their home using equity release products, whereby equity is given up to the lender in 
return for a lump sum or lifetime income (Williams, 2008). A small proportion of people 
in later life may be lifted out of poverty using these products (Hancock, 1998), but largely 
it is middle income younger retirees in average value homes who have engaged with this 
market not those at the bottom of the income scale (Overton, 2010). Equity release is a 
challenging market to develop, for borrowers and lenders, and therefore remains a 
marginal activity (Overton, 2010; Terry and Gibson, 2010; Fiona Boyle Associates, 2008).  
Reinold (2011) and Schwartz et al. (2008) found the major cause of housing equity 
withdrawal was through older and/or last time homeowners in the UK and US selling up 
or downsizing, primarily to boost other asset holding.  Banks et al. (2010) using 
longitudinal data shows that trading down, albeit for a variety of reasons, is an 
increasingly important part of older life as 11 per cent of older homeowners move each 
year. However, lower income older homeowners move less frequently and release less 
capital as their homes are smaller and of less value.  
Following the death of a homeowner, the sale of the property may also lead to bequests. 
Saunders (1990) suggested that homeownership would make the UK a nation of 
inheritors. Holmans (2008) found that the low value of homes meant that for many 
homeowners there was insufficient equity to pay for long term care or other services and 
as many of the new entrants to homeownership from the 1980s onwards are still alive, 
the rate at which people inherit equity remained low. Longitudinal analysis reinforces 
this, as although the number and value of bequests of housing assets has grown slightly 
over recent years, few people receive substantial sums, and these are people who are 
already wealthy in their own right (Karaganakki, 2011).  In these circumstances housing 
bequests have increased rather than decreased wealth inequalities.  
Following the financial crisis, housing equity withdrawal is now negative as more people 
are putting money into the system than withdrawing it, with possible consequences for 
the wider economy (Reinold, 2011). This is primarily because there are fewer housing 
market transactions, not because homeowners are repaying their mortgages. As there 
are fewer first time buyers injecting equity into the market there are fewer chains and 
people – older homeowners or developers- extracting equity at the end of the transaction 
chain. There has also been fewer people obtaining further advances on mortgages, so 
equity has been less frequently withdrawn from over-mortgaging or seeking additional 
loans than prior to the financial crisis.  
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A major risk to homeownership was identified as the ability of homeowners to sustain 
their mortgage and remain in the home (Ford et al., 2001). The increased incorporation 
of housing equity into homeowners’ financial plans during the life-course and in 
retirement, however uneven this may be, means that the loss of housing equity becomes 
a new risk to homeownership (Smith and Searle, 2009). None of the empirical studies to 
date have examined the impact of significant house price falls on homeowners. With the 
substantial falls in housing equity observed in Northern Ireland, this study examines what 
potential remains, and what the limits are, to the use of housing equity in future welfare 
planning. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has provided an overview of the arguments that situate homeownership and 
the accumulation of housing wealth as an important component of asset-based welfare, 
and the expectations that people will be able to access these funds to provide for 
themselves at critical moments during the life course to increase their financial resilience. 
Evidence also shows, however, that the use of housing equity is contingent on a range of 
institutional and cultural factors and homeowners of different ages differ in their ability 
and desire to utilise these reserves. However, the use of these resources to smooth 
income is not risk free.  Nevertheless, the resources potentially available to homeowners 
have, hitherto, been substantial and some homeowners obtain immense security from the 
knowledge that equity could be used in a crisis.  
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3: NORTHERN IRELAND’S HOUSING MARKET 
 
Introduction 
The UK has been subject to the longest and deepest economic downturn ever and the 
economy remains 2.1 per cent smaller than in 2008 (Plunkett et al., 2014). Although 
some growth was witnessed during 2013, it is uncertain how long any damage resulting 
from the downturn will take to repair and median household incomes are set to remain 
around 3.5 per cent below their peak in 2008 until 2018-2019 (ibid.). In this mix, the 
Northern Ireland housing market has experienced profound price changes. This chapter 
provides an overview of the local market, setting out the environment in which 
homeowners’ loss of housing equity is considered in the remainder of the report. Trends 
in respect of prices, lending and transactions within the market are traced, and the 
reasons behind the volatility observed. The contraction in the housing market and the 
subsequent extent of negative equity and mortgage arrears in the region are examined.  
Drivers of housing market change 
Northern Ireland’s housing market had not previously been subject to the rapid rises and 
slumps that began to characterise the market in Great Britain from the 1970s onwards 
(Adair et al., 1998). The legacy of conflict in Northern Ireland meant for many years there 
was a lack of investor confidence in the region’s housing market. However, during the 
last decade the housing market turned around dramatically and reached a situation of 
Summary 
 Northern Ireland’s house prices rose rapidly up to 2007, since when prices 
have fallen substantially and have entered 2014 50-60 per cent below their 
peak market values. 
 Homeowners have lost significant sums in the value of their homes, with the 
median house price reduced by £101,388 between 2007 and 2013. 
 Housing market sale transactions are currently increasing and some modest 
price increases were witnessed during 2013, suggesting that the market had 
‘bottomed out’.  
 As a consequence of the significant market falls, however, the incidence and 
magnitude of negative equity in Northern Ireland is still estimated to be 
higher than elsewhere in the UK.  
 Court claims made for mortgage possessions against Northern Ireland’s 
homeowners remain stubbornly high, but across the UK as a whole 
possession action taken by lenders has fallen steadily since 2009.  
 More Northern Ireland homeowners are ‘mortgage prisoners’ stuck on old 
mortgage deals and unable to switch to new products or lenders, compared 
to across the UK. 
 Residential property transactions were 63 per cent below their market peak by 
2013, compared to 36 per cent below across the whole UK, indicating 
constrained residential mobility in Northern Ireland. 
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‘irrational exuberance’ (Frey and Gray, 2010). There is a lack of consensus around the 
precise reasons why such volatility occurred, but essentially a series of processes and 
events coalesced to produce a very different housing market to what had gone before.   
Adair et al. (1998) argued that the impact of the end of the historic conflict was important 
but subsidiary to economic factors in explaining the rise in house prices from the mid-
1990s. Besley and Mueller (2011) did find a peace dividend reflected in house prices as 
there was a negative correlation between incidents of violence and house prices. 
However, Gibb et al. (2007) noted a wider range of influential factors that continued to 
fuel house price growth, including spill-over effects from the Celtic Tiger in the Republic 
of Ireland, a buoyant economy in Northern Ireland, UK macro conditions, low mortgage 
interest rates and demographic changes, which all had an impact on investment activity.  
Advice NI (2007) examined qualitative responses to the affordability problems associated 
with the rising markets and found that property speculation was of great concern. 
Investment from the Republic of Ireland is spoken of as a contributory factor in 
speculative housing market activity. However, McCord et al. (2011) observe that although 
there is some cross border activity between Northern Ireland and the Republic there are 
few interconnections between the two housing markets. Frey (2008) suggests that the 
relationship between the Republic and Northern Ireland’s housing markets can be over-
stated as the similar market trajectories are as much a response to the same wider 
international developments in global economies, liberal lending practices and 
international migration as direct transactional links. There is evidence of stalled 
investments in Northern Ireland by investors from the Republic who have defaulted and 
NAMA – the Government agency in the Republic charged with disposing of stock in 
possession of the bailed out banks- has holdings worth £90 million in Northern Ireland 
(NAMA, 2012). However, the market volatility in the North has been a product of 
multiple factors, and includes self-generated market behaviours. Frey and Gray (2010) 
record that NIHE (Q3-2006) did sound a cautionary note, suggesting that rising prices 
were unsustainable, but viewed the local construction and housing market industry as 
myopic in its inability to curtail its activities. Bridle (2008:1) suggested that the “upswing 
was marked by exuberance, some might say hubris”, and moreover, that the market 
adjustment represented a journey into the unknown as Northern Ireland lacked any 
precedent for a genuine market cycle. 
House price volatility 
After experiencing none of the housing market fluctuations of previous decades seen in 
the UK, Northern Ireland’s housing market has seen extraordinary instability during the 
past decade. The region witnessed an unprecedented surge in house prices before the 
onset of the financial crisis in 2007, followed by a severe market crash.  Figure 3.1 
illustrates the rise and fall of the Northern Ireland housing market with reference to UK 
regions.  
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Figure 3.1: UK Mix-adjusted house prices 1993-2011 (£) 
 
Source: DCLG Housing Statistics Table 507 NB: North West only calculated since 1999 
 
Figure 3.2 compares Northern Ireland’s house prices to that of Great Britain and shows 
that the housing market in Northern Ireland had previously been one of steady house 
price growth and had not been subject to the market fluctuations evident in Great Britain 
in the later 1980s and early 1990s. House prices rose nominally during this period but 
had not kept pace with inflation. The regional market did not experience the price booms 
of the late 1980s, but neither did it experience the price falls, mortgage arrears and 
repossessions of the early 1990s seen elsewhere in the UK (McCord et al., 2011).  
Figure 3.2: Comparative house price trends GB and NI 1985-1997 
 
Source: Reproduced from Adair et al. (1998) 
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Rising housing market 
During the period to 2007, housing affordability was of significant concern in Northern 
Ireland. In 2001, 16 per cent of those on median wage earnings could afford a lower 
price home, but by 2004 only five per cent of individuals on median earnings could do so 
(Semple, 2007). The median advance to first time buyers in 2001 was £50,000, but by 
the peak of the market in 2007 the median advance had more than doubled to 
£117,999 (Council of Mortgage Lenders, Table ML2). House prices to earnings ratios had 
increased sharply but unevenly across Northern Ireland (Wilcox, 2007). Wilcox’s study 
used 2005 data and found that house prices for average two or three bedroom homes to 
earnings ratios for younger households ranged from 2.68 in Armagh to 4.24 in Strabane, 
suggesting that affordability problems were localised. While Strabane was the area with 
the highest average house price to income ratios, Cookstown had by far the highest 
proportion of younger working households unable to buy at the lower end of the market. 
During this period, mortgage rates were low, which meant that the relationship between 
mortgage costs and earnings was less problematic. However, the proportion of first time 
buyers in the market reduced from 62 per cent in 2001 to 32 per cent by 2007 (Council 
of Mortgage Lenders, Table M1NI).  
Falling housing market 
Various house price indices are available in Northern Ireland, produced by the University 
of Ulster and NIHE, the Northern Ireland’s Statistical and Research Agency’s (NISRA) 
Residential Property Price Index (NI RPPI) and those produced by Halifax and Nationwide 
across the UK.   The relative strength of these indices may be debateable as they are 
based on different transaction samples and adopt different methods, but it is beyond this 
study to consider the merits of each data source. The key point for the purposes of this 
study –examining the impact of any falls in house prices on the actual homeowner- is that 
all indices depict significant decline in house prices in the region from the market peak, 
unprecedented in any region of the UK.  
Using the NISRA standardised data (NI RPPI), overall the market fell 54 per cent from the 
peak at Q3-2007 to Q4-2013. During the year 2013, Northern Ireland’s housing market 
rose four per cent overall, so by Q4-2013 prices were still nine per cent below their 2005 
values (NI RPPI, 2014b) (Figure 3.3).  
Of course, the picture is complicated by differential experiences of house price changes 
across different property types and locations.  Figure 3.4 shows the standardised average 
house prices for different property types between 2005 and 2013.  The house price falls 
vary from around 60 per cent for terrace homes to 54 per cent for semi-detached homes. 
In terms of absolute losses, the sums are substantial. The median standardised house 
price across all property types has fallen from £200,000 in 2007 to £98,612 by Q3-
2013, a loss of £101,388 in house price values. 
 
 
 
27 
 
Figure 3.3: NI Residential Property Price Index 2005-2013 
 
Source: NISRA NI RPPI 
Figure 3.4: Standardised price by property type Q1-2005 to Q3-2013. 
 
Source: NISRA NI RPPI 
In respect of different local housing markets, areas such as Outer Belfast and the East of 
the region have higher house values than the North or the West of the region, but in 
terms of house price movements the fluctuations have, using NI RPPI data, followed 
similar patterns (Figure 3.5).  
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Figure 3.5: Standardised price by area 2005-2013. 
 
Source: NISRA NI RPPI 
House price decline has now halted and all areas of Northern Ireland saw price growth 
during 2013. Using NI RPPI data, overall between Q1 and Q4-2013 the housing market 
in Northern Ireland rose by four per cent, the first rises across the whole market since 
2007.  There have also been increased market transactions through 2013, so by Q4-
2103 there were 28 per cent more sales than at Q4-2102 (NISRA, 2014b). The strength 
of any market rise is subject to the vagaries of the local economy, the wider UK, Euro-
zone, global economies; as well as the impact of welfare reform and public sector 
restructuring which may have adverse impacts on effective housing demand in the region 
in the coming period (Frey, 2013; UU/NIHE Q1-2013). Nonetheless, Northern Ireland’s 
housing market enters 2014 more buoyant than at any time since the market crash. 
First time buyers 
It is clear the housing market peak was 2007, but first time buyer activity in the market 
rose and fell prior to this date (Figure 3.6). The number of first time buyers in the 
Northern Ireland market grew sharply from 1995 onwards, possibly due to greater 
confidence and more favourable market conditions following the ceasefires, and was at 
its highest in 2002 after which time first time buyer activity tailed off significantly most 
likely due to the affordability constraints up to 2007. This may have protected some 
vulnerable households from the subsequent fall in prices from 2007 onwards. Although 
well below the volume of market activity prior to the market downturn, by Q1-2013 first 
time buyers represented 60 per cent of all property purchases, perhaps indicating 
improved affordability as well as the challenges in moving on for existing homeowners, 
not least ‘second steppers’. 
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Figure 3.6: Number of first time buyers Northern Ireland 1974 to 2012 
 
Source: CML Table MINI 
Affordability has improved with first time buyers in Northern Ireland entering the market 
using loans based on lower income multiples, 2.85 by Q4-2013 compared to multiples of 
3.55 at the peak of the market Q2-2007; and also using smaller advances of £70,200  
Q4-2013 compared to £121, 949 in 2007 (CML Table ML2NI). Typical first time buyer 
advances in 2012 represented 80 per cent of the property’s value (ibid.), suggesting 
deposits of 20 per cent. In percentage terms, deposits have been broadly similar to this 
since 2005/6, with higher loan-to-values only being present when the market was first 
rising. However, while proportionately typical deposits may be similar, the absolute 
values are now much reduced. Mortgage payments as a proportion of income have 
reduced significantly from a quarter of income in 2007/8 to below a fifth (17.2 per cent) 
by the beginning of 2013, a further indication of improved affordability. Household 
incomes used to obtain loans also decreased from nearly £35,000 in 2007 to £23,000 in 
2013 meaning that the market has become accessible to a broader range of buyers.  
Moreover, 72 per cent of first time buyer purchases in Northern Ireland purchased 
property below the £125,000 stamp duty threshold compared to only 40 per cent in the 
UK (CML, 2014). Deposit constraints – as well as wider market confidence and prudent 
mortgage lending- remain a barrier to entry to some first time buyers as there was a 
limited supply of reasonably priced high loan-to-value mortgages available on the 
market. There has been some loosening up of the mortgage market, but the impact of 
the new regulatory regime from April 2014, which seeks to enforce tighter affordability 
checks and prudent lending in the market, remains to be seen. Nevertheless, the house 
price falls have produced benefits for many new entrants to the market. 
The UK Treasury’s Help-to-Buy scheme introduced an equity sharing scheme from April 
2013, providing loans of 20 per cent of the property’s value but this is unavailable in 
Northern Ireland. The second stage of the Help-To-Buy scheme, where taxpayers will 
guarantee 95 per cent loans, was introduced in October 2013 and is available in 
Northern Ireland, but its’ impact remains unclear, although it obviously has the potential 
to boost housing market activity. Although the proportion of first time buyers has grown 
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in recent years in Northern Ireland, there were only 3500 mortgaged home-movers in 
2012, the lowest level since 1974 (CML Table M1NI). Help-to-buy may offer some 
comfort to second time movers who also require high loan-to-value loans to move on. 
However, the extent of negative equity in Northern Ireland (see below) sees Help-to-Buy 
of limited value to some existing homeowners, and as first time buyer activity is relatively 
buoyant in the market, addresses a problem relevant to elsewhere but arguably fails to 
address local requirements.  
Property transactions 
The volume of verified transactions recorded by NI RPPI in 2012 (13,651) represent less 
than half the transactions during 2006 (41,387) (Figure 3.7). Although by 2010 the 
market had contracted to a quarter of its peak activity (10,787), the volume of sales has 
picked up and in 2013 the total sales are estimated to be the highest since the market 
crash. Only sales of apartments remain sluggish, although this may reflect a decline in 
new supply in this submarket following the market downturn. 
Figure 3.7: Verified property transactions in Northern Ireland 2005-2013 
 
Source: NISRA NI RPPI  
HMRC figures for property transactions over £40,000 in Northern Ireland show an 
increase from 14,800 in 2009 to 18,690 during 2013, but transactions are still 63 per 
cent below the peak in 2006 of 50,330, compared to 36 per cent below peak across the 
UK (HMRC, 2013).  
Tenure distribution 
The market volatility has also had an impact on the proportion of owner-occupied homes 
in Northern Ireland. As in the rest of the UK, homeownership peaked early in the last 
decade and stood at 69 per cent in 2004/5, but has since fallen to 64 per cent by 
2011/12 (Figure 3.8).  Constrained access to homeownership due to affordability 
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problems in the boom and a combination of low consumer confidence and inability to 
secure large mortgage deposits mean fewer younger people have entered the tenure, 
increasing demand, and supply, in the private rented sector.  Private renting grew from 
six per cent in 2001/2 to 15 per cent in 2011/12. 
Figure 3.8: Total housing stock by tenure in Northern Ireland (per cent) 2001-2012. 
 
Source: DSD Northern Ireland Housing Statistics 2011-12 Table 1.2 
The prospects for the Northern Ireland market are uncertain. Although the bottom of the 
market in Northern Ireland has been called several times, there are signs that price 
decline has now halted, activity is growing and prices better reflect the local economy 
and incomes. However, several indicators suggest that the context of a weak economic 
recovery, government austerity, welfare reform, household indebtedness and cautious 
mortgage markets could suppress activity in the short to medium term.   
Negative Equity 
One consequence of declining housing markets is negative equity, where, for a cohort of 
mortgagors at least, the value of their homes falls below the amount owed on their 
mortgages. Not only have any accumulated assets diminished, but should the 
homeowner wish to, or be required to, move they will experience further problems. As 
the sale of their home fails to achieve sufficient funds to repay the loan they immediately 
crystallise this loss and incur a shortfall debt to the mortgage lender. However, the vast 
majority of mortgagors retain significant sums of housing equity, despite the housing 
market downturn, the incidence and magnitude of negative equity has ramifications for 
individuals, the wider local economy and institutions such as banks and government 
agencies.  
Estimating the scale of negative equity is ‘notoriously difficult’ and sensitive to the data, 
methods and assumptions used (Hellebrandt et al., 2009; FSA, 2012; Purdey, 201; Tatch, 
2009). Nonetheless, recent assessments of the extent of negative equity in the UK 
mortgage market suggest that around 10 per cent of mortgagors have loans in excess of 
the value of their homes (CML, 2012; FSA, 2012). The CML estimated that around 
719,000 borrowers were in negative equity by 2012, with borrowers who bought at the 
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peak of the market most affected. Indeed, the CML estimated that 26 per cent of UK 
mortgages taken out in 2007 were in negative equity.  
Within these aggregate figures there are, however, great spatial variations. Figure 3.9 
illustrates a range of estimates of the incidence of negative equity in Northern Ireland 
and regions within Great Britain, using lenders’ data. It is important to note that these 
data record only those loans advanced since 2005 and do not represent all mortgagors. 
During spring 2012 it was estimated that Northern Ireland had the greatest incidence of 
mortgagors in negative equity, with estimates ranging from around 28 per cent to 37 per 
cent of all homeowners who purchased from 2005, compared to Greater London where, 
depending on which house price index is adopted, only between zero and 6-7 per cent of 
loans exceed the value of the home on which they are secured.  
Figure 3.9: Proportion of borrowers in negative equity by UK region Q1-2012 
 
Source: Financial Services Authority (2012)  
NB: estimates use only mortgages LTV >100 per cent advanced since 2005. 
Possible impacts of negative equity 
There are a possible range of consequences of negative equity for the wider economy 
and individual borrowers, but isolating the effects of negative equity from wider 
phenomena during a recession is difficult.   In aggregate, widespread negative equity 
may have an adverse impact on the macro-economy. For individual borrowers, negative 
equity may constrain residential mobility, limit their ability to remortgage, and may 
complicate their management of mortgage arrears.    
Lower house prices may reduce investment in housing or, through what economists term 
‘wealth effects’, indirectly depress consumer spending in the wider economy (Hellebrandt 
et al., 2009). The association between negative equity and weak demand is uncertain, 
however, but there is an association between lower collateral and lower consumer 
spending.  Moreover, Hellebrandt et al. also suggest that consumers may increase their 
savings rate to overcome the shortfall in other resources due to falling house prices, thus 
lowering consumption, and experience constrained access to credit thus reducing the 
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supply of credit to the wider economy. Disney et al. (2008) suggest only a weak 
relationship between consumption spending and house price changes, although the 
effect is much stronger for homeowners in negative equity. 
Often borrowers in negative equity are not unduly concerned, unless they wish to move, 
following a change in circumstances, a job move or if they were struggling with 
household finances (Tatch, 2009). Aside from household impacts of constrained mobility 
in such circumstances, an aversion to realising any losses on the home can lead 
borrowers in negative equity to be reluctant to move, reducing tax receipts, and spending 
on housing markets services, including durable goods and agents’ fees, with implications 
for the wider economy (Hellebrandt et al., 2009). Henley (1998, cited in Hellebrandt et 
al., 2009) notes that twice as many homeowners in negative equity would have moved 
than actually did in the 1990s if it had not been for the negative equity. However, as the 
CML note, negative equity may well be a cause of lower property transactions, but low 
consumer confidence, economic uncertainty and restrictive lending criteria also have an 
effect and suppress demand (CML, 2012). 
Another impact of negative equity is that borrowers are unable to remortgage and have 
become ‘mortgage prisoners’ (FSA, 2012). Being locked into a current mortgage deal 
may also be influenced by tighter lending criteria, following a more cautious approach to 
the mortgage market following the crisis, but having no or very little equity contributes to 
an inability to access other mortgage deals. Some borrowers may be locked into good 
deals although others may experience standard variable rates rising in the short-term. In 
2008, 66 per cent of mortgage market activity in Northern Ireland constituted 
remortgaging, but this fell to 34 per cent by 2012 (CML Table ML1NI). A high proportion 
of UK borrowers are now unable to remortgage and are trapped because they have high 
loan-to-values (typically first time-buyers), interest-only loans that are no longer available 
(typically remortgagors or home-movers), but also because of previous remortgaging and 
a history of payment problems (typically Right-to-Buy purchasers) (FSA, 2012). Across the 
UK, the FSA estimates that around 30 per cent of remortgagors who did not withdraw 
any housing equity are now mortgage prisoners, compared to around 50-55 per cent of 
those who withdrew additional funds for home improvements, and around 45-50 per 
cent of those who withdrew funds for debt consolidation are now trapped in their current 
deals (ibid.). Figure 3.10 illustrates the extent of mortgage prisoners by region. Again 
Northern Ireland has the greatest incidence of ‘mortgage prisoners’ with the highest 
volume of borrowers trapped in mortgage deals compared to other regions of the UK at 
almost 65 per cent, although the gap between Northern Ireland and other regions of the 
UK is less pronounced than the incidence of negative equity.  
The impact of negative equity on mortgage arrears is moot. The evidence may turn on 
the data used and the methodological approaches and assumptions brought to bear on 
the issue. For example, economic theories indicate that negative equity is necessary for 
mortgage default to occur, and that homeowners with positive equity rarely default on 
their loans (Foote et al., 2008). Classical economics will consider the asset-value of a 
property and thus suggest that when returns diminish the borrower will rationally decide 
to exit from the investment. However, empirical data indicates a much lower number of 
borrowers in negative equity who are in mortgage arrears than economic theory would 
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suggest. Foote et al. therefore find that the loan being “underwater” –or in negative 
equity-  may be necessary but is not sufficient for default to occur, as borrowers also 
make rational calculations about the prospects of forbearance and loans modifications 
offered by lenders. 
Figure 3.10: The proportion of borrowers considered to be ‘mortgage prisoners’ by 
region 
 
Source: FSA (2012). 
Foote et al. reject subjective explanations – such as the sentimental attachment to home, 
transaction costs or stigma - that limit the link between negative equity and mortgage 
arrears and favour rational economic justifications.  But residential property also has a 
use-value, so borrowers do often consider their commitment to the family home, the 
stability for children, and feel shame at being repossessed and stridently attempt to keep 
their home when faced with repayment difficulties (Wallace et al., 2011; Nettleton et al., 
1999).  
The US evidence is mixed, but most strongly suggests that borrowers make conscious 
decisions to stop paying their mortgage when faced with negative equity even if they 
have the resources to meet their mortgage. The legal context differs between the US and 
the UK, as in some, but not all, ‘non-recourse’ states in the US, lenders are prohibited 
from pursuing borrowers for shortfall debts incurred when the sale proceeds were 
insufficient to repay the loan in full. In the UK, lenders may seek repayment of shortfall 
debts for 12 years. While some US studies confirm the view that negative equity is the 
most significant driver of arrears (Goodman, 2010), others reject this and suggest that 
unemployment is the main influence on the rate of mortgage default (Gerardi et al., 
2013).   
UK evidence typically rejects a causal link between negative equity and mortgage default 
and such a link is not accepted by the Council of Mortgage Lenders (Tatch, 2009; Purdey, 
2011; CML, 2012). Several studies may lend evidence to support the CML position but 
determining the exact relationship is empirically challenging. The first obvious 
observation to make is that homeowners with positive housing equity do fall into 
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mortgage arrears; indeed around half of borrowers seeking support in the first year of 
the Mortgage Rescue Scheme in England held equity in their home (Wilcox et al., 2010).  
Secondly, May and Tudela (2005) found no evidence of equity (positive or negative) 
having an impact on mortgage arrears. However, May and Tuleda note that their data 
went back as far as 1993 and omitted part of the price fall from 1990-1993 in the last 
housing market downturn.   In addition, in the Republic of Ireland, Kelly et al. (2012) 
found only a weak relationship between arrears and negative equity, but one that grew 
stronger between 2009 and 2011, when the probability of a borrower being both in 
financial distress and with negative equity increased from 2.4 per cent to 6.5 per cent. 
Using qualitative data, Forrest and Kennet (1996) identified the ways in which borrowers 
in negative equity coped with their situation during the 1990s. Borrowers did not always 
have a rationalised strategy to overcome their situation and did not necessarily believe it 
was something that needed to be resolved in the short-term.  However, higher earners 
were able to save more to reduce their negative equity; others delayed their progression 
on the ‘housing ladder’, rented out their home to facilitate mobility, traded down or 
improved their home to decrease the loan-to-value ratio. At no juncture in Forrest and 
Kennet did borrowers suggest that they would make strategic or ‘rational’ calculations to 
default.  
The third observation to make is that there is strong UK evidence that shows labour 
market disruption is a major prompt for mortgage arrears- i.e. a reduction in working 
hours and/or overtime, failure of self-employment or unemployment- accounting for 
around half of all cases, with relationship breakdown and sickness and ill-health also 
being important (Gall/BSA; Wilcox et al., 2010; Ford et al., 2001; Policis, 2010). The FSA 
agrees that life events do trigger mortgage arrears, but that the causes of arrears may be 
deeper, as many mortgage borrowers have high loan-to-values and are financially over-
stretched (FSA, 2012). The greater incidence of secondary loans and multiple debts has 
complicated the management of arrears for lenders and borrowers (Ford and Wallace, 
2009; Wilcox et al., 2010). Aron and Meulbauher (2010, 2012) found that there was an 
association between the rate of repossessions – not just mortgage arrears - and the 
proportion of mortgages in negative equity, as well as the debt service ratio, 
unemployment rate, lenders’ forbearance policies and credit factors.   
Several studies try and untangle the relationship between other triggers to default such 
as unemployment and negative equity (Gerardi et al., 2013; Goodman et al., 2010) and 
acknowledge that having multiple adverse circumstances can amplify the rate at which 
people fall into mortgage arrears. However, the magnitude of negative equity may be 
critical. A US study, Bhutta et al. (2010), found that strategic default only emerged once 
negative equity reached -62 per cent of the home’s original value. So borrowers only 
made strategic decisions to not pay their mortgage when their equity fell substantially. 
Two further points are also important to bear in mind when considering the impacts of 
negative equity. Firstly, negative equity may produce short or medium term effects, but it 
is also important to take a lifecycle perspective. Over the course of a person’s 
homeownership career the long term impacts of negative equity may be minimised. 
Secondly, for borrowers who have only small amounts of positive equity in their homes, 
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the impacts in the current market may be the same as if they had negative equity, with 
constrained access to credit and immobility, for example, so the effects may be felt more 
widely than the numbers in negative equity may suggest (CML, 2012).  
There have been no other studies of negative equity in the context of Northern Ireland, 
but a study in the Republic of Ireland provides some interesting insights into who has 
been affected (Murphy et al., 2013:10).  It was apparent in the Republic that rural 
homeowners took a conservative approach to mortgage finance, with most rural homes 
in the study being owned outright, and that it was urban dwellers who could be 
considered to have been the most ‘profligate’ during the boom years and thus had the 
greatest incidence of negative equity. Furthermore, self-build housing reduced the 
exposure of homeowners to market volatility, as they typically have low loan-to-values.  
Mortgage arrears  
Notwithstanding the uncertain relationship with negative equity, one consequence of the 
wider market downturn has been the increase in mortgage arrears and repossessions. 
Across the UK repossessions peaked at 48,900 during 2009 and reduced to 28,900 in 
2013 (CML, 2014). Across the UK as a whole there has been a clear downward trend in 
the number of possessions since 2009. The primary data on repossessions in the UK 
derives from the Council of Mortgage Lenders and the Financial Conduct Authority, but 
neither publishes regional variations in arrears and repossessions. The Northern Ireland 
Courts and Tribunals Service publish quarterly data on possession actions and decisions 
entered in the Chancery Division (NICTS, 2012). Figure 3.11 shows that the number of 
cases (applications for possession) lenders made to the Chancery from 2007 to 2013 had 
been consistently high throughout the period of market downturn. After a steep rise from 
2007 onwards, when the claims made peaked at 3,906 in 2009, there was a short drop 
in claims made for possession on the grounds of mortgage arrears, possibly due to the 
introduction of the Pre-Action Protocol into the Northern Ireland court system. Following 
this dip claims for possessions entered in court have increased and totalled 3,694 cases 
in 2013. 
Figure 3.11: Possession claims for mortgage arrears in NI 2007 to 2013 (No.) 
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Source: NI Courts and Tribunals Service 
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In contrast, the number of mortgage possession claims in County Courts in England and 
Wales  increased  from 62,862 in 2002 to a peak of 142,741 in 2008, since when it has 
fallen 62 per cent to 53,659 in 2013 (Ministry of Justice, 2014) (Figure 3.12).  
 
Figure 3.12: Possession claims for mortgage arrears in England & Wales 2007-2013  
(No.) 
 
Source: Ministry of Justice  
Not all applications lenders make for possession of the property may result in a 
possession order or eviction, but possession claims data are an indicator of housing stress 
and insecurity among mortgagors. Lenders are subject to the same mortgage regulation 
in England and Wales and Northern Ireland and must therefore adopt the same 
approach to the industry guidelines of Treating Customers Fairly when managing 
mortgage arrears and agreeing forbearance. However, there are differences in the legal 
framework between the two jurisdictions and the length of the legal process is 
significantly longer in Northern Ireland (Waller, 2012). Lenders must also return to court 
if a suspended possession order is broken in Northern Ireland, but in England and Wales 
they can move directly to request a bailiff warrant. When orders are granted in Northern 
Ireland claims made more often result in a full possession order being granted than in 
England and Wales where courts are as likely to award an order suspended on terms (for 
example, requiring the contractual amount of the mortgage to be paid plus 
£50/£100/£150  a month towards the arrears, depending on the borrowers’ 
circumstances) (Figure 3.13).  
Overall across the UK, the proportion of mortgagors experiencing possession during this 
market downturn is much lower when compared to mortgagors during the 1990s 
recession. During this downturn the contributions made by historically low interest rates, 
amendments made to Support for Mortgage Interest from 2009, lower than anticipated 
unemployment and greater forbearance on the part of lenders has limited the number of 
possessions. While attention in Great Britain has turned to an improving situation in 
respect of arrears and possessions potentially being reversed by the spectre of welfare 
reform and rising interest rates as the economy recovers (Wilcox and Williams, 2013), the 
situation in Northern Ireland remains challenging without considering the prospect of 
these further threats.  
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Table 3.13: Proportion of orders made on possession claims in England & Wales and 
Northern Ireland 2009-2013 (per cent) 
 
Source: NICTS and Ministry of Justice  
One explanation why possession claims in Northern Ireland remain high compared to 
England and Wales may be the limited opportunities for Northern Ireland homeowners to 
sell their way out of financial difficulties. The Council of Mortgage Lenders do not publish 
data on the number of sales made by homeowners in financial distress, but it is necessary 
to understand this exit from homeownership as well as the formal possession figures to 
understand the extent of struggling mortgage borrowers (Ford et al., 2010). The English 
Housing Survey suggests that the number is consistent and is likely to exert a downward 
pressure on possessions. These voluntary sales decline in a recession, possibly due to the 
presence of negative equity, which would inhibit sales. Consequently, it is likely that more 
homeowners are pushed through the formal procedures to resolve default than is the 
case in areas where the markets remain more buoyant and voluntary sales can be 
achieved.  
Another issue to consider is that analysis of lenders’ loan book data has revealed that 
Northern Ireland also has the highest rates of mortgage arrears on buy-to-let loans of all 
UK regions (Wallace and Rugg, 2014). As at September 2013, 6.2 per cent of all buy-to-
let loans in Northern Ireland held by one large UK lender were at least one month in 
arrears.  Lenders adopt formal court processes to take possession of a property when 
buy-to-let loans default, or use the Land and Property Act 1922 to appoint a receiver of 
rent to manage the property, collect the rent and then dispose of the property. CML data 
includes properties that have been repossessed through the courts as well as taken into 
possession by the receiver and shows that the proportion of possessions attributed to buy-
to-let is growing as residential possessions are falling (ibid.). Policymakers in Northern 
Ireland must consider, therefore, that the local court data includes a proportion of orders 
granted in respect of buy-to-let loans and that further data is required before concluding 
the exact scale and trends relating to local residential mortgage possessions.  
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The adverse impacts of mortgage possession on individuals and their families are well 
documented (Nettelton et al., 1999; Pevalin, 2009). Since the downturn various steps 
have been taken to support borrowers in mortgage arrears and prevent possessions. The 
Northern Ireland Assembly has responsibility for social security in Northern Ireland but 
largely maintains parity with the welfare system that exists in Great Britain. Therefore, 
Support for Mortgage Interest (SMI) – a subsidy to meet mortgage interest payments to 
those on certain qualifying benefits – is available in Northern Ireland.  SMI was made 
more generous from January 2009 and proved effective in supporting lenders to offer 
forbearance in response to the financial crisis, although the payments were reduced from 
October 2010 and the scheme rendered less successful in supporting borrowers in 
arrears (Munro et al., 2010; Ford et al., 2011).  
As in England and Wales and Scotland, in 2010 the Northern Ireland Courts and 
Tribunals Service adopted a Pre-Action Protocol setting out the courts’ expectations of 
lenders seeking possession on the basis of mortgage arrears, which was revised in 2011 
to ensure that lenders pursued repossession as a last resort. The Northern Ireland 
protocol provides for sanctions should the lenders fail to comply. However, as in England 
and Wales, the impact of the protocols –independent of lender forbearance – is 
uncertain, as lenders had already changed their arrears management practices to offer 
greater forbearance terms (Ford and Wallace, 2009). As in Great Britain, the Northern 
Ireland Department for Social Development has also enhanced funding to advice services 
to provide effective support to borrowers in mortgage arrears (Dolaghan et al., 2010). 
Demand for the Mortgage Debt Advice Service increased by 26 per cent betweenQ2- 
2012 to Q2-2013 (NI Housing Rights, 2013).  
However, other support for homeowners struggling with mortgage payments in Northern 
Ireland varies slightly to that in Great Britain. Unlike England (Wilcox et al., 2010), 
Scotland (Bramley et al., 2009) and Wales (WAG, 2009) a mortgage rescue scheme is 
absent from Northern Ireland, although it has been considered. These schemes were 
developed to provide an opportunity for qualifying borrowers in unsustainable arrears, 
usually at the lower end of the housing market where they are unable to trade down to 
avoid possession, to sell all or part of their property to a housing association and then 
rent it or occupy it on the basis of a shared equity arrangement. The schemes are small 
but considered cost effective when set against the expenditure on homeless services, 
housing benefit and hard to monetise costs to education, health and family relationships.  
An important, arguably the most important, feature of the schemes is that the possibility 
of a resolution prompts more borrowers to make contact with their lender and engage 
with debt advice services, thus avoiding the need for possession or mortgage rescue. 
Unfortunately, in England new applications for Mortgage Rescue cease from April 2014, 
and have already ceased in London. The Preventing Repossession Fund was also 
introduced in England during 2009 and provided local authorities with funds to use as 
they saw fit to prevent individual households from losing their homes (Parliament, 2014). 
The funds were not tenure specific and were typically £1000 to £3000 but capped at 
£5000. These funds had been used to facilitate the mortgage rescue schemes (Wilcox et 
al., 2010) but had also been used to provide small interest free loans to tide struggling 
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homeowners over periods of financial stress and prevent them losing their home due to 
the recession. Again this scheme is not available in Northern Ireland.  
Wilcox and Williams (2013:11) note the threats to the safety nets and support available 
to borrowers with welfare reform, not least because borrowers may have to wait 39 
weeks instead of 13 weeks before receiving any Support for Mortgage Interest (SMI), in a 
period when the full effects of the credit crunch have yet to work through. Struggling 
homeowners in Northern Ireland are therefore in a vulnerable position. Moreover, under 
the Universal Credit proposals, support to homeowners will be weakened further as 
homeowners will not qualify for SMI at all if any work has been undertaken in the 
household, rather than up to 16 hours per week which is currently permitted. This will 
mean a cliff edge fall off in support despite the rationale for Universal Credit being the 
smooth transition of people into work and the gradual removal of benefit as hours of 
work and income increases. 
Conclusions 
The Northern Ireland housing market has for various reasons experienced extraordinary 
house price change leaving local homeowners subject to greater negative equity and an 
inability to remortgage to competitive rates. Transactions and mortgage lending, 
particularly for home-movers, have fallen substantially since the market peak in 2007, 
although there has been increased housing market activity during 2013 and the decline 
in house prices has now halted. Further impact of the downturn remains, however, as 
more homeowners in Northern Ireland are unable to remortgage, are in negative equity 
and possessions for mortgage arrears remain high at a point when possessions have 
fallen steadily across the whole UK. 
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4: NORTHERN IRELAND’S HOMEOWNERS AND (HOUSING) 
ASSETS 
 
Introduction 
To contribute to an assessment of the strengths and limitations of housing wealth in the 
region, this section draws upon the Family Resources Survey (FRS) to provide a profile of 
Northern Ireland’s homeowners and how their circumstances, use of mortgage finance 
and their housing equity has changed throughout the housing market cycle. The 
Summary 
 The Family Resources Survey records that the proportion of all households in 
homeownership grew during the housing market boom, reaching 72 per cent 
during the period 2005/6 to 2007/8, but declined to around 66 per cent 
during 2008/9 and 2010/11. The tenure shifts away from homeownership 
towards private renting appear more pronounced in Northern Ireland than 
across the UK as a whole. 
 Northern Ireland has a greater proportion of homeowners in lower income 
bands and lower occupation classes than the rest of the UK, where the 
proportion of these households in homeownership has reduced. 
 A third of households with children in the bottom income quintile live in 
households headed by a homeowner. 
 Northern Ireland’s homeowners, especially those on lower incomes, exhibited 
more conservative behaviour in the mortgage market than homeowners 
across the UK, making less use of interest-only loans, subprime loans and 
remortgaging.  
 Lower income homeowners in Northern Ireland engaged with remortgaging 
later in the market cycle. At the peak of the market, a lower proportion of 
homeowners in Northern Ireland engaged with remortgaging for 
consumption or ‘other’ purposes than homeowners across the UK, but also 
switched to better interest rates less frequently.  
 A greater proportion of all Northern Ireland mortgagors (14 per cent) 
experienced negative equity between 2008/9 to 2010/11 than across the UK 
(9.5 per cent). The mean estimated value of that negative equity was also 
greater in Northern Ireland (£35,162) compared to the rest of the UK 
(£17,485). 
 Single people, couples under pension age with no children, households in 
smaller homes and in intermediate or professional occupations who bought 
after 2005 or remortgaged experienced negative equity more frequently in 
Northern Ireland. Those in the bottom income quintile held the greatest 
estimated value of negative equity. 
 Lower proportions of Northern Ireland’s homeowners held current accounts or 
savings accounts than across the UK.  
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circumstances of Northern Ireland’s homeowners are contrasted with those of all UK 
homeowners. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates how pooled data from the FRS has been used, according to whether 
it represents the years when the housing market was rising, at its peak or was falling.  
Figure 4.1 Standardised Average House Prices in Northern Ireland (£) 2002-2011 
 
Source: NI RPPI NISRA 
Profile of homeowners in Northern Ireland 
Extent of homeownership 
The last decade has produced growing concerns that UK homeownership is in decline. 
Anxieties centre on unfulfilled aspirations, the lack of access and security in other tenure 
and the financial consequences for particularly younger and lower income households 
over the life course (Resolution Foundation, 2013; Shelter, 2013; Lloyd, 2012). 
As mentioned, Northern Ireland’s housing market has not been immune to the recent 
seismic shifts in housing tenure that has seen homeownership fall and private renting 
grow rapidly (Figure 3.8). The 2011 Census, records 67 per cent of households as 
homeowners, compared to 68 per cent in 2001, but more frequent estimates of tenure 
suggest that the census data fails to capture the increase and subsequent decrease in the 
proportion of homeownership in the region in the intervening period. The FRS records 
that the average proportion of households in homeownership was 72 per cent during the 
period 2002/3 to 2007/8, but fell back to 66 per cent during the period 2008/9 to 
2010/11. Using the same data, the tenure shifts have been less pronounced across the 
whole of the UK, where 70 per cent of households were in homeownership during 
2002/3 to 2004/5, 69 per cent in the period 2005/6 to 2007/8 and 68 per cent during 
2008/9 to 2010/11.  
The 2011 Census reflects the decline in new entrants to homeownership in Northern 
Ireland and suggests the ageing of the tenure, as the proportion of outright owners 
increased from 29 per cent to 32 per cent between 2001 and 2011, and the proportion 
of mortgaged homeowners decreased from 39 per cent to 35 per cent over the same 
period (NI Assembly, 2013). 
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Social Class 
Homeownership is not a homogenous tenure and although often associated with more 
affluent higher income groups, as the dominant tenure, homeowners encompass a 
diverse set of households across all social classes and income groups. Indeed, half of all 
poor households reside in homeownership (Burrows, 2003; Tunstall et al., 2013). 
Nonetheless, across the UK as a whole the changing distribution of tenure in the last 
decade has seen a reduction in lower income homeowners. It appears a similar upward 
shift in the households that reside in homeownership in Northern Ireland, however, is 
less apparent. 
Compared to homeowners across the UK, a greater proportion of Northern Ireland head 
of households who are homeowners have been and still are in the lower 
supervisory/technical and semi-routine/routine social classes and this has been relatively 
stable throughout the period of the housing market cycle (Table 4.1). During the period 
2002/3 to 2004/5, 31.8 per cent of Northern Ireland homeowners were in these social 
classes, this decreased to 29 per cent at the market peak between 2005/6 to2007/8 and 
then rose again to 30.8 per cent between 2008/9 to 2010/11. In contrast, across the UK 
the proportion of heads of household who were homeowners in these two occupational 
classes fell throughout the market cycle from 29.5 per cent to 25.9 per cent.  The 
proportion of small employers/own account who were homeowners in the UK remained 
stable throughout the period, but fell in Northern Ireland, although the proportion of self-
employed homeowners in Northern Ireland remains considerably higher than across the 
whole of the UK in each market stage. Table 4.2 shows occupational class by income 
quintile and indicates that small employer/own account (self-employed) workers are the 
most likely to be represented in the bottom income quintile. It is notable that the 
proportion of household references persons who had never worked grew during the 
recession, but possible explanations may include youth unemployment and/or the 
proportion of older women in later life who now live alone. The higher rate of low 
income self-employed homeowners in Northern Ireland is a concern due to their 
difficulties in accessing Support for Mortgage Interest in the event of income shocks and 
mortgage payment difficulties (Ford et al., 2001). 
Table 4.1: Social class for homeowners in NI and UK through the market cycle (%) 
 
NI Homeowners UK Homeowners 
HRP NS-Sec 5 class Rising Peaking Falling Rising Peaking Falling 
Managerial/ 
Professional 
40.9 40.9 41.8 49.7 51.4 52.9 
Intermediate 8.4 9.5 8.3 9.0 8.5 9.0 
Small employers/ 
own account 
17.1 16.0 15.1 10.3 10.4 10.1 
Lower supervisory/ 
technical 
12.3 10.0 10.1 11.0 10.0 9.4 
Semi-routine/ routine 19.5 19.0 20.7 18.5 17.4 16.5 
Never worked 1.9 4.5 4.0 1.5 2.2 2.1 
Source: Family Resources Survey 
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Table 4.2: Social class homeowners in Northern Ireland 2008/9 to 2010/11 (%) 
 
Household income quintiles (AHC) 
Total 
 
Bottom 2nd Middle 4th Top 
Managerial/professional 15.1 16.7 25.8 42.8 68.3 41.8 
Intermediate 3.5 9.1 7.6 10.3 7.6 8.3 
Small employers/own account 38.7 21.6 20.8 9.3 8.4 15.1 
Supervisory/ technical 2.6 9.2 11.8 13.0 8.3 10.1 
Semi-routine/routine 22.4 34.0 29.3 23.0 6.7 20.7 
Never worked/LT UB 17.6 9.2 4.6 1.6 0.6 4.0 
Source: Family Resources Survey (AHC = After Housing Costs) 
Household income 
Across the piece households in Northern Ireland, including homeowners, have lower 
household incomes compared to households across the UK, although homeowners have 
slightly higher incomes than households across all tenure (Table 4.3). During the three 
periods of the housing market cycle household incomes rose by around a fifth for all 
households, but the rise was slightly less pronounced for homeowners in Northern 
Ireland, whose income before housing costs rose 18 per cent between the periods 
2002/3 to 2004/5 and 2008/9 to 2010/11, compared to the 20 per cent increase for 
homeowners across the whole of the UK. Before housing costs are taken into account, 
household incomes in the bottom quintiles for households in all tenure across the UK 
rose by 26 per cent, compared to only 23 per cent in Northern Ireland, but the household 
income for bottom income quintile homeowners in Northern Ireland grew the least, by 
only 18 per cent across the same period, compared to 23 per cent for lowest quintile 
homeowners across the UK. After housing costs are taken into account the income gap 
between Northern Ireland’s homeowners and their counterparts across the UK narrows, 
no doubt due to the historically lower housing costs in Northern Ireland; the household 
income of the lowest quintile homeowners in Northern Ireland rose by 22 per cent, 
marginally below the 23 per cent rise in the household income after housing costs of the 
lowest quintile homeowners across the UK. These data do not reflect inflation during this 
period that has seen prices increase at a higher rate than incomes, thus reducing 
households’ purchasing power (Resolution Foundation, 2014). 
Using the ratio between the household incomes at the 20 per cent and 80 per cent mark 
as an indicator of inequality, the gap between the richest and the poorest is slightly 
greater in the UK than in Northern Ireland, especially for households across all tenure 
compared to just households in homeownership, (Table 4.4). Moreover, this indicator of 
social distance reduced slightly between the periods of the rising and falling market. 
45 
 
Table 4.3 : Total household income, before and after housing costs 
Housing market stage 
UK NI 
All tenures Owner occupiers All tenures Owner occupiers 
BHC AHC BHC AHC BHC AHC BHC AHC 
Rising 
market 
Median (£pwk) 411.94 377.16 489.54 458.62 361.19 337.86 426.00 404.00 
Quintiles 
(£pwk) 
20 234.00 198.28 271.64 258.62 213.07 187.93 249.00 237.00 
40 341.79 310.34 414.00 387.86 307.46 283.68 369.17 347.03 
60 494.00 456.00 572.00 537.93 420.30 395.07 492.47 465.52 
80 730.83 684.48 813.43 770.65 609.20 578.00 686.00 650.00 
 N. 25,155,187 17,690,368 648,441 467,862 
 
Peaking 
market 
Median (£pwk) 459.70 419.17 543.28 504.00 406.00 374.46 467.00 435.62 
Quintiles 
(£pwk) 
20 264.18 222.41 302.00 283.33 238.81 210.34 268.22 256.00 
40 384.29 345.00 456.00 426.76 344.00 313.00 397.11 373.24 
60 552.00 505.00 636.00 592.00 476.88 441.15 544.44 511.41 
80 819.55 758.33 914.93 854.93 680.60 639.66 762.09 715.71 
N. 25,770,351 18,020,208 668,547 481,855 
 
Falling 
market 
Median (£pwk) 501.00 455.17 585.07 553.45 438.00 406.34 504.48 481.52 
Quintiles 
(£pwk) 
20 295.00 244.69 333.00 317.00 261.19 229.00 293.00 284.69 
40 421.00 376.67 497.01 468.97 373.13 341.85 435.00 411.73 
60 594.00 547.00 688.00 648.28 510.75 475.35 585.07 555.17 
80 878.57 823.00 988.72 935.87 719.40 679.58 811.00 775.71 
N. 26,476,685 17,939,306 699,380 466,331 
Notes: Analysis of the FRS. Household incomes have been equivalised (using the modified OECD and companion scales). Rising market = 2002/03, 
2003/04, 2004/05; Peaking market = 2005/06, 2006/07, 2007/08; Falling market = 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11. Figures are weighted to give 
three-year national level estimates for each of the three housing market stages. 
Source: Family Resources Survey 
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Table 4.4: Ratio between 80 per cent and 20 per cent of household income 
Housing 
market 
stage 
UK All 
Tenure 
80/20 
ratio 
BHC 
UK  All 
Tenure 
80/20 
ratio 
AHC 
UK HO 
80/20 
ratio 
BHC 
UK HO 
80/20 
ratio 
AHC 
NI All 
Tenure 
80/20 
ratio 
BHC 
NI All 
Tenure 
80/20 
ratio 
AHC 
NI HO 
80/20 
ratio 
BHC 
NI HO 
80/20 
ratio 
AHC 
Rising 3.12 3.45 2.99 2.98 2.86 3.08 2.76 2.74 
Peak 3.10 3.41 3.03 3.02 2.85 3.04 2.84 2.80 
Falling 2.98 3.36 2.97 2.95 2.75 2.97 2.77 2.72 
Source: Family Resources Survey 
The proportion of heads of households who are unemployed and homeowners in 
Northern Ireland is smaller than that across tenures, but has risen as a result of the 
market downturn (Table 4.5). During the period of the falling housing market 2008/9-
2010/11, the 4,620  heads of households who were unemployed homeowners 
represented a significant proportion (29 per cent) of all unemployed in Northern Ireland, 
slightly higher than the 27 per cent across the UK as a whole.  
 
Table 4.5: Head of household unemployed by tenure and country 
Source: Family Resources Survey 
Household Composition 
Table 4.6 shows the household composition of homeowners in Northern Ireland 
compared to all households during the period 2008/9 to 2010/11, and Table 4.7 focuses 
on households with or without children. A lower proportion of homeowners are single (19 
per cent), compared to households in all tenures (25.6 per cent). The proportion of single 
pensioners is slightly lower in homeownership (10.1 per cent) than across all tenures 
(11.8 per cent), but as homeownership is the dominant tenure, homeowners represent 
more than half of single pensioner households. The proportion of single pensioner 
homeowners has also increased slightly from 8.9 per cent during the period 2002/3 to 
2004/5 compared to 10.1 per cent during the period 2008/9 to 2010/11, reflecting the 
ageing of the homeownership sector. Lone parents are also under-represented in 
homeownership as they comprise seven per cent of all households but only three per cent 
of homeowners. Working age couples, with or without children, are slightly over-
represented in homeownership, comprising 22 per cent and 16.5 per cent of all 
households, but 25.4 per cent and 17.6 per cent of homeowner households respectively. 
Couples with at least one member above pension age are over-represented in 
homeownership, comprising 17.5 per cent of homeowners and 13.9 per cent of all 
households. Pensioner couples in homeownership comprise almost a quarter of the 
bottom two income quintiles.   
Housing market 
stage 
NI All tenure 
NI Home-
owners 
UK all tenure UK home-owners 
Rising 
Rate (%) 1.90 0.80 1.90 0.90 
No. 12,564 3,838 483,853 157,070 
Peak 
Rate (%) 1.30 0.50 1.90 0.70 
No. 8,637 2,400 480,466 127,763 
Falling 
Rate (%) 2.30 1.00 2.60 1.00 
No. 15,840 4,620 698,874 187,128 
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Source: Family Resources Survey [*Couple with at least one pensioner]
Table 4.6: Northern Ireland household types by tenure and income quintile 2008/9 to 2010/11 
 NI All Tenure NI Homeowners  
 
Income quintiles (AHC) Income quintiles (AHC) 
Total 
Bottom 2nd Middle 4th Top Total Bottom 2nd Middle 4th Top 
Single 
pensioner 
Count 13837 29270 21525 13553 4593 82778 6711 14218 11837 10376 4170 47312 
% hhld  type 16.7 35.4 26.0 16.4 5.5 100.0 14.2 30.1 25.0 21.9 8.8 100.0 
% quintile 11.4 20.9 13.6 8.7 3.7 11.8 14.4 17.9 11.3 8.3 3.7 10.1 
Single non-
pensioner 
Count 27839 12851 17974 17692 20059 96415 5783 3928 6339 9604 15796 41450 
% hhld  type 28.9 13.3 18.6 18.3 20.8 100.0 14.0 9.5 15.3 23.2 38.1 100.0 
% quintile 22.9 9.2 11.3 11.3 16.4 13.8 12.4 4.9 6.1 7.7 14.2 8.9 
Pensioner 
couple* 
Count 14405 23756 26471 20695 11903 97230 10874 18563 21158 19456 11586 81637 
% hhld  type 14.8 24.4 27.2 21.3 12.2 100.0 13.3 22.7 25.9 23.8 14.2 100.0 
% quintile 11.8 17.0 16.7 13.2 9.7 13.9 23.3 23.3 20.3 15.6 10.4 17.5 
Non-
pensioner 
couple 
Count 12394 13034 18679 34797 36751 115655 5562 8359 10561 24710 32684 81876 
% hhld  type 10.7 11.3 16.2 30.1 31.8 100.0 6.8% 10.2 12.9 30.2 39.9 100.0 
% quintile 10.2 9.3 11.8 22.2 30.0 16.5 11.9 10.5 10.1 19.9 29.3 17.6 
Couple 
with 
children 
Count 19928 29780 37967 35918 30446 154039 10055 18815 28611 31513 29367 118361 
% hhld  type 12.9 19.3 24.6 23.3 19.8 100.0 8.5 15.9 24.2 26.6 24.8 100.0 
% quintile 16.4 21.3 24.0 22.9 24.8 22.0 21.5 23.7 27.4 25.3 26.4 25.4 
Lone 
parent 
Count 20748 14563 6532 4207 1425 47475 2021 3591 2801 2707 1247 12367 
% hhld  type 43.7 30.7 13.8 8.9 3.0 100.0 16.3 29.0 22.6 21.9 10.1 100.0 
% quintile 17.0 10.4 4.1 2.7 1.2 6.8 4.3 4.5 2.7 2.2 1.1 2.7 
Multi adult 
Count 12646 16774 29227 29667 17474 105788 5674 12048 23084 25961 16562 83329 
% hhld  type 12.0 15.9 27.6 28.0 16.5 100.0 6.8 14.5 27.7 31.2 19.9 100.0 
% quintile 10.4 12.0 18.5 19.0 14.2 15.1 12.2 15.2 22.1 20.9 14.9 17.9 
Total 
Count 121797 140028 158375 156529 122651 699380 46680 79522 104391 124327 111412 466332 
% hhld  type 17.4 20.0 22.6 22.4 17.5 100.0 10.0 17.1 22.4 26.7 23.9 100.0 
% quintile 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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Table 4.7: Households with children by tenure and market cycle in Northern Ireland  
Source: Family Resources Survey 
  
  
  
Market stage of housing cycle 
NI all tenure NI Homeowners 
Household income quintiles 
Total 
Household income quintiles 
Total 
Bottom 2nd Middle 4th Top Bottom 2nd Middle 4th Top 
Rising 
No 
Children 
Count 106,293 90,440 89,588 75,590 53,424 415,335 50,960 53,953 68,631 68,473 51,010 29,3027 
% no 
children 
25.6 21.8 21.6 18.2 12.9 100.0 17.4 18.4 23.4 23.4 17.4 100.0 
% of quintile 63.8 62.5 61.8 63.7 72.7 64.1 68.6 57.5 57.3 62.4 72.6 62.6 
Children 
  
Count 60,397 54,192 55,355 43,080 20,082 233,106 23,337 39,802 51,112 41,284 19,299 174,834 
% quintile 36.2 37.5 38.2 36.3 27.3 35.9 31.4 42.5 42.7 37.6 27.4 37.4 
Peaking 
No 
Children 
Count 86,918 91,599 91,696 92,618 74,483 437,314 44,557 57,126 64,015 78,557 68,638 312,893 
% no 
children 
19.9 20.9 21.0 21.2 17.0 100.0 14.2 18.3 20.5 25.1 21.9 100.0 
% of quintile 62.9 63.9 61.7 67.6 73.5 65.4 69.6 62.9 56.8 65.8 72.3 64.9 
Children 
  
Count 51,270 51,812 56,973 44,359 26,818 231,232 19,496 33,701 48,663 40,744 26,358 168,962 
% of quintile 37.1 36.1 38.3 32.4 26.5 34.6 30.4 37.1 43.2 34.2 27.7 35.1 
Falling 
No 
Children 
Count 75,496 88,708 100,744 107,670 86,426 459,044 31,379 51,929 62,642 81,603 76,633 30,4186 
% no 
children 
16.4 19.3 21.9 23.5 18.8 100.0 10.3 17.1 20.6 26.8 25.2 100.0 
% of quintile 62.0 63.3 63.6 68.8 70.5 65.6 67.2 65.3 60.0 65.6 68.8 65.2 
Children 
  
count 46,300 51,321 57,631 48,860 36,224 24,0336 15,301 27,592 41,749 42,724 34,778 162,144 
% of quintile 38.0 36.7 36.4 31.2 29.5 34.4 32.8 34.7 40.0 34.4 31.2 34.8 
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Table 4.7 shows that around a third of households in Northern Ireland include children. 
The proportion of homeowner households containing children overall has reduced slightly 
from 37.4 per cent to 34.8 per cent between the periods 2002/3 to 2004/5 and 2008/9 
to 2010/11. Following on from the finding that two parent families are more likely to be 
in homeownership, even in the bottom income quintiles, the proportion of homeowner 
households that contain children in the bottom income quintile has risen very slightly 
between the periods 2002/3 to 2004/5 and 2008/9 to 2010/11, from 31. 4 per cent to 
32.8 per cent, but has fallen in absolute terms from 23,337 families to 15,301 as the 
proportion of homeowners has reduced. Nonetheless, in the period 2008/9 to 2010/11, 
a third of the 46,300 households with children in all housing tenure in the bottom 
income quintile lived in households headed by a homeowner.  
Mortgage finance 
Mortgages in Northern Ireland are regulated by the UK Financial Conduct Authority, 
formerly the Financial Services Authority (FSA). The recent Mortgage Market Review (FSA, 
2012) reflected concerns that regulatory oversight was weak during the period of the 
housing market boom, and that borrowers and lenders were left vulnerable in the market 
downturn due to exuberant patterns of lending and borrowing. Of particular concern 
were high loan-to-values, high loan-to-incomes, interest-only loans and self-certified 
lending. This section provides some evidence from the FRS to examine some of these 
concerns in the context of Northern Ireland. 
Type of mortgage 
Interest-only loans are now considered to be problematic because, unless they are 
accompanied by a sound repayment vehicle, which is often not the case, then there is a 
risk that the loan will not be repaid at the end of the mortgage term. The use of interest-
only mortgages has declined as the regulators have been concerned about their habitual 
use in the market place and the ability of households to repay their loans. A recent 
review suggests that around half of all homeowners with interest-only mortgages in the 
UK will suffer shortfalls in their repayment plans (Experian, 2013; GfK, 2013). 
Across the whole of the UK and in Northern Ireland the use of interest-only mortgages 
fell between the period 2002/3 to 2004/5 and 2008/9 to 2010/11, but their use remains 
greater in the UK (Table 4.8). Overall, in Northern Ireland, interest-only loans 
represented 41.7 per cent of all loans during the period of rising housing markets but fell 
to 19.8 per cent by the third period. In the UK, the fall has been less pronounced, 
reducing from 41.3 per cent to 27.4 per cent. In the early period of rising markets in 
Northern Ireland, homeowners with incomes at or below 60 per cent of median income 
held a lower proportion of interest-only loans than those with incomes above this poverty 
threshold, whereas in the UK the use of interest-only loans was very similar for all 
homeowners. However, by the period when housing markets were falling, in the UK and 
Northern Ireland, poorer homeowners more frequently held interest-only mortgages than 
homeowners not in poverty – 23.9 per cent of poorer homeowners in NI compared to 
19.2 per cent homeowners not in poverty and 32.2 per cent of poorer homeowners in the 
UK compared to 26.9 per cent not in poverty.  
50 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.8: Mortgage types by 60 per cent median household income for the UK and Northern Ireland by housing market stage (%) 
 
NI UK 
Housing market stage 
Total 
Housing market stage 
Total Rising Peaking Falling Rising Peaking Falling 
Household income 
less than 60 per 
cent median 
income (AHC) 
Repayment 60.4 74.4 75.8 70.1 57.5 65.3 67.2 63.2 
Interest (all types) 38.5 24.8 23.9 29.1 41.0 34.1 32.2 35.8 
Other 1.1 0.8 0.3 0.7 1.6 0.6 0.6 0.9 
Household income 
60 per cent of 
median income or 
greater (AHC) 
Repayment 57.5 74.7 80.6 70.2 57.7 68.5 72.5 66.0 
Interest (all types) 42.1 25.1 19.2 29.5 41.3 30.9 26.9 33.3 
Other 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.7 
Total 
Repayment 57.8 74.6 79.9 70.2 57.7 68.2 72.1 65.8 
Interest (all types) 41.7 25.1 19.8 29.5 41.3 31.2 27.4 33.5 
Other 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.4 1.0 0.6 0.6 0.7 
Source: Family Resources Survey 
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This suggests that while Northern Ireland’s homeowners, lower income homeowners in 
particular, made less frequent use of interest-only loans than in the UK – and this is 
confirmed in analysis by Experian (2013) - as the housing market fell more affluent 
homeowners have been able to convert to repayment loans at a greater rate than lower 
income owners, who are more frequently left on interest-only terms with the incumbent 
risk of non-repayment.  
Table 4.9 provides further illustration that poorer homeowners more frequently retain 
interest-only loans and that there is a social gradient to the type of mortgage loan held 
across the income quintiles. Across the UK, there was little difference in the use of 
interest-only loans between homeowners on different incomes during the period of rising 
markets, but by the third stage of the market cycle and falling house prices lower 
proportions of more affluent homeowners used interest-only loans. This is reflected in 
Northern Ireland, with one exception, that a slightly greater proportion of homeowners in 
the top quintile use interest-only loans than in the middle and fourth quintile (Table 4.9). 
Of concern are the 4.2 per cent of all loans in Northern Ireland that the FRS records as 
interest-only but are not linked to any investment vehicle to repay the capital, although 
this is half the proportion across the UK as a whole  (9.8 per cent) (not shown).  
Table 4.9: Type of mortgage loan by income quintile 2008/9 to 2010/11 (%) 
 
Household Income Quintiles (AHC) 
Total 
Bottom 2nd Middle 4th Top 
UK 
Repayment 60.4 68.3 71.7 73.0 74.3 72.1 
Interest (all 
types) 
38.6 31.2 27.8 26.5 25.1 27.4 
Other 1.1 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.6 
Northern Ireland 
Repayment 70.2 77.1 82.3 83.8 78.3 79.9 
Interest (all 
types) 
29.3 22.9 17.5 15.6 21.7 19.8 
Other 0.6 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.0 0.3 
Source: Family Resources Survey 
The FRS does not record the use of subprime loans, possibly because they are hard to 
identify. Subprime loans are generally considered to include self-certified loans and credit 
impaired lending. These loans emerged in the 1990s and were priced to reflect the 
higher risks involved, enabled new cohorts of homeowners into the market and facilitated 
borrowers to rehabilitate their credit history (Munro et al., 2005). Subprime borrowers  
were four times more likely to experience default  than borrowers in the mainstream 
market (Stephens and Quilgars, 2007) and during the first year of the Mortgage Rescue 
Scheme in England, subprime loans constituted between 60-80 per cent of all 
applications for support (Wilcox et al., 2010). Keasey and Veronesi (2012) map the 
geography of subprime lending and found that the number of people with subprime 
loans placed Northern Ireland in the mid-range of exposure to such loans, in comparison 
to similar areas in England, such as the North East and Midlands where the take up of 
subprime loans was higher. 
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Remortgage activity 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the use of mortgage equity withdrawal increased during the 
last housing market boom. Homeowners may remortgage while remaining in situ to 
obtain better interest rates on their loan and/or to withdraw equity for a variety of 
reasons. Equity withdrawal and the reasons for it are indicators of the extent to which 
homeowners have engaged with their home as a financial asset. 
The FRS asked respondents whether they had remortgaged in the current year. The 
analysis shows that remortgaging activity increased during the period of the rising 
housing market, but reduced only slightly following the market fall (Table 4.10).  
Remortgaging activity in Northern Ireland has been consistently below that across the UK. 
A total of 37.6 per cent of homeowners across the UK remortgaged when the market was 
rising, which increased to 42.1 per cent at the peak of the market, falling back slightly to 
41.6 per cent in the third period of falling markets. In contrast, only 24.3 per cent of 
homeowners in Northern Ireland remortgaged in the first period, rising to 30.9 per cent 
by the market’s peak, and reducing only slightly to 30.1 per cent as the market fell. 
Across the UK as a whole and in Northern Ireland, lower income homeowners had a 
lower incidence of remortgaging than middle and higher income groups. Moreover, 
despite homeowners in the bottom two income groups comprising a fifth of the 
remortgaging activity (21.1 per cent) in Northern Ireland, compared to only 15.3 per cent 
of remortgaging across the UK as a whole - no doubt reflecting the greater number of 
lower income homeowners in Northern Ireland – lower income homeowners in Northern 
Ireland remortgaged less than their counterparts across the UK at each stage of the cycle. 
Furthermore, lower income homeowners in Northern Ireland overall also remortgaged 
less frequently than middle and higher income groups.   
Table 4.10 also demonstrates that lower income homeowners came late to remortgaging 
in Northern Ireland, with the greatest proportions of the bottom quintile groups 
remortgaging when the market was falling (29.6 per cent), rather than when the market 
was rising (17.8 per cent) or at its’ peak (20.2 per cent). This contrasts to other income 
quintiles in the UK and in Northern Ireland that, rather than remortgaging in greater 
numbers as the markets fell as these bottom income groups did, maintained or even 
reduced their level of remortgaging as the cycle progressed. The differential activity of 
lower or higher income groups is further illustrated by considering remortgaging by 
whether the homeowners were at or below 60 per cent of the median household income 
(Table 4.11). This table shows that in the UK, lower income homeowners had 
remortgaged during the rising housing market as well as at its peak, but in Northern 
Ireland the poorest homeowners only remortgaged in any numbers later in the market 
cycle; at the peak or as the markets fell.  
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Table 4.10: Remortgaging activity by income quintile and housing market stage for UK and Northern Ireland (%) 
Source: Family Resources Survey 
 
Table 4.11: Remortgaging activity by above or below 60% median household income and market cycle in UK and NI (%) 
Source: Family Resources Survey 
 
UK NI 
Household Income Quintiles (AHC) 
Total 
Household Income Quintiles (AHC) 
Total 
Bottom 2nd Middle 4th Top 
Botto
m 
2nd 
 
Middle 
4th Top 
Rising 31.1 35.1 38.0 39.2 38.7 37.6 17.8 22.7 26.2 24.5 26.6 24.3 
Peaking 37.4 40.1 44.0 43.5 41.6 42.1 20.2 32.8 32.6 31.3 31.3 30.9 
Falling  39.9 41.2 42.1 43.5 40.5 41.6 29.6 24.3 27.7 32.0 32.8 30.1 
Total (% 
remortgage) 
6.8 8.5 16.4 26.5 41.7 100.0 8.2 12.9 21.6 28.6 28.7 100.0 
 
 
UK NI 
Market stage of housing cycle 
Total 
Market stage of housing cycle 
Total Rising Peaking Falling Rising Peaking Falling 
Household income less than 60 per  cent 
median income 
1.8 1.7 0.7 1.4 0.5 1.5 0.8 0.9 
Household income 60 per cent of median 
income or greater 
6.8 5.6 3.1 5.1 3.9 4.0 1.4 3.1 
Total (% market stage) 5.9 5.0 2.7 4.5 3.2 3.5 1.3 2.7 
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Homeowners may remortgage for a variety of reasons, such as withdrawing equity from 
the home, or to pursue better interest rates. It is therefore difficult to interpret whether 
high rates of remortgaging are acceptable or whether they represent risks to the 
homeowners and therefore undermine their resilience.  The FRS asks the reasons why 
homeowners have remortgaged and these data are shown in Table 4.12.  We have seen 
that Northern Ireland’s homeowners remortgage less frequently than homeowners across 
the UK, but there are also marked differences between the reasons UK and Northern 
Ireland’s homeowners advance for remortgaging.  A greater proportion of Northern 
Ireland homeowners have consistently used remortgaging activity to fund home 
improvements in each period of the housing market cycle, compared to all homeowners 
across the UK. In addition, a smaller proportion of Northern Ireland’s homeowners have 
used remortgaging to switch to better interest rates less often and have also made 
significantly less use of the ‘other’ category.   
Notably, greater proportions of Northern Ireland homeowners used remortgaging to 
purchase items and for ‘other’ reasons in the falling market than in the rising or peak of 
the market, possibly reflecting that for some homeowners in Northern Ireland they 
engaged with remortgaging later than their counterparts in the UK.  
Not all reasons for equity withdrawal are comparable and, as mentioned, it is difficult to 
interpret. For example, remortgaging to obtain better interest rates is entirely favourable 
towards building homeowners’ financial resilience as it reduces housing costs; and using 
equity withdrawal to fund home improvements may add or maintain the value of the 
home in a way that using equity withdrawal to purchase consumption goods would not. 
Parkinson et al. (2009) analysed panel data that revealed equity withdrawal activity for 
‘other’ reasons was associated with key life events, like the birth of children or job loss. 
Homeowners in Northern Ireland have engaged significantly less with this category of 
remortgaging than homeowners across the UK, although its use did increase during the 
market cycle but it is unclear what may have prompted this activity, possibly debt 
consolidation in the recession. In addition, fewer Northern Ireland homeowners switch 
mortgages to find better interest rates and because of this other studies have noted that 
lower income homeowners end up paying more than required for their homeownership 
experience (Belsky et al., 2003). There are too few cases to disaggregate the reasons for 
mortgage equity withdrawal by income quintiles. 
Several indicators suggest that Northern Ireland’s homeowners adopted a more 
conservative approach to mortgage finance in comparison to homeowners across the 
whole of the UK. Homeowners in Northern Ireland displayed moderate levels of 
subprime loans, despite higher rates of self-employment and a greater proportion of 
lower income homeowners than across the UK; had lower remortgaging rates and lower 
rates of interest-only loans, not least those without a repayment vehicle. Lower income 
homeowners did engage with remortgaging later in the market cycle, but converted to 
repayment loans at a lower rate than more affluent borrowers. The most frequent reason 
for remortgaging in Northern Ireland was for home improvements. On balance, this 
suggests that lower income homeowners were less exposed to riskier products, which 
may have mitigated the impact of the market downturn.  
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Table 4.12: Reasons for remortgaging by housing market stage in the UK and Northern Ireland (%) 
Source: Family Resources Survey 
  
 
Improvements 
Purchase 
items 
Interest rates Business Buy Out Share 
Essential 
repairs 
Flexible 
mortgage 
Other 
UK NI UK NI UK NI UK NI UK NI UK NI UK NI UK NI 
Rising 59.7 69.3 8.3 7.7 23.4 15.7 3.7 3.0 6.0 4.3 2.6 2.6 7.3 5.1 15.1 8.1 
Peaking 59.3 72.6 10.4 8.8 22.8 11.9 3.5 2.9 5.7 4.1 3.1 4.0 7.2 4.3 17.1 9.5 
Falling 57.0 66.5 9.7 11.2 23.0 13.2 3.2 3.4 6.9 2.9 3.3 2.3 6.1 2.6 17.0 13.3 
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Housing equity in Northern Ireland   
As illustrated in Chapter 3, proportionately, Northern Ireland has suffered the most 
sustained decline in house prices compared to the UK as a whole since the financial crisis 
began in 2007. This section uses the FRS micro-data to consider the extent and size of 
changes to homeowners’ housing equity. 
The approach adopted here to examine negative equity is outlined in Chapter 1. The 
following analysis of the proportion of homeowners in Northern Ireland in negative 
equity is broadly similar to those of the Council of Mortgage Lenders (Purdey, 2011), but 
differs in key ways. The relevant uplift in value based upon the Halifax House Price Index 
is applied to the respondents’ recollection of the purchase price of their home to estimate 
the current property value. Then the homeowner reported outstanding mortgage debt is 
deducted from the estimated current value to provide an estimate of the amount of 
equity, or otherwise, that was remaining by 2010/11. However, the Council of Mortgage 
Lenders estimates of negative equity use extensive loan book data supplied by lenders, 
with exact purchase prices and exact outstanding loan amounts, rather than those 
recalled by survey respondents as in this analysis. Moreover, the Council of Mortgage 
Lenders have been able to adjust the loan balances by deducting exact contractual 
mortgage repayments over time as well as accounting for any arrears or charges, which 
the FRS data does not support. The number of respondents from Northern Ireland in the 
FRS is also smaller than that available from lenders. Nonetheless, the results are broadly 
in line with the most recent estimates of negative equity, and uniquely using FRS data 
means that the accompanying household data provides a richer description of the 
circumstances of households in negative equity than mortgage data alone. Moreover, the 
Council of Mortgage Lenders data uses only loans advanced from 2005/6 onwards, 
rather than all mortgagors as in the FRS.  
Using the method outlined above, the FRS suggests that 14 per cent of Northern Ireland’s 
mortgagors were estimated to be in negative equity by 2010/11 compared to 9.5 per 
cent across the UK (Table 4.13).  
 
Table 4.13: Negative equity in the UK and Northern Ireland, 2010/2011 
Source: Family Resources Survey 
 NI UK 
In negative 
equity 
Count (weighted) 29,593 782,711 
% within region 14.0 9.5 
Mean negative equity 
£35,162 
 
£17,485 
 
Median negative equity 
£18,942 
 
£10,173 
 
Not in negative 
equity 
Count (weighted) 181,744 7,479,401 
% within region 86.0 90.5 
Mean positive equity £89,408 £111,101 
Median positive equity £76,064 £74,793 
Total Count (weighted) 211,337 8,262,112 
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At this time (2010/11) almost 30,000 homeowners in Northern Ireland owed more on 
their mortgages than their homes were worth. The mean negative equity held by 
homeowners in Northern Ireland was twice that of UK homeowners at £35,162 
compared to only £17,485 in the UK. There was a wide variation in the value estimates 
of negative equity and so the median figures were lower at £18,942 and £10,173 
respectively. As noted in Chapter 3, the housing market continued to fall between 2011 
and 2013 and it is likely that the incidence and magnitude of negative equity in Northern 
Ireland will have deteriorated further since these data were recorded. Nonetheless, this 
analysis represents the first examination of the circumstances associated with negative 
equity in Northern Ireland. 
Table 4.13 used the FRS data for 2010/11 to establish the extent of the negative equity. 
This 2010/1I sample includes too few Northern Ireland cases to permit further detailed 
analysis, so data for the three ‘falling market’ years - 2008/9 to 2010/11 - are pooled to 
provide sufficient numbers to examine who and to what extent households are affected 
by the falling market. Table 4.14 shows the incidence of negative equity among 
household with different characteristics. The incidence of negative equity is greatest in 
Northern Ireland among households who live in two bedroom properties (19.4 per cent), 
one bedroom properties (17.9 per cent),were single and never married (17.5 per cent) or 
who were couples under pension age with no children (16.8 per cent). A broadly similar 
pattern to the households with negative equity was also evident across the whole of the 
UK, except that lone parents and married but separated households also had elevated 
rates of negative equity, although the rates were generally lower across the whole of the 
UK. Curiously, couples with one person above pension age were broadly as likely to be in 
negative equity in the UK (4.2 per cent) as in Northern Ireland (3.8 per cent). Across the 
UK as a whole, negative equity was more evenly spread among households in different 
income quintiles compared to Northern Ireland. A social gradient to households with 
negative equity was more evident across occupation classes in Northern Ireland than 
across the UK. Although in Northern Ireland intermediate occupations were the most 
likely to be in negative equity (13.9 per cent), the managerial and professional class was 
also more likely to carry negative equity (11.2 per cent) compared to the routine and 
manual and never worked classes (7.7 per cent and 8.8 per cent respectively). Again this 
may reflect the fact that lower income homeowners have been retained in greater 
proportions in the Northern Ireland market than across the whole UK. Overall, these data 
suggest that an earlier life stage and higher occupational class are important indicators 
of households in negative equity in Northern Ireland, so homeowners with no children, 
singles or couples, in small properties, and in intermediate and professional or 
managerial jobs. This is consistent with the CML lending data for Northern Ireland that 
records the higher incomes used by first time buyers who secured homes at the peak of 
the market compared to now.  
 
Table 4.15 provides the estimated equity holdings of households with different 
characteristics. The greatest estimated value of negative equity in Northern Ireland was 
found among homeowners in the bottom income quintile (£72,379). This compares the 
estimated mean value of negative equity of £25-30,000 for other income groups where 
between 9 and 11 per cent of homeowners were affected.  
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Table 4.14: Characteristics of all mortgagors in UK and Northern Ireland with negative 
equity, 2008/9 to 2010/11 (%) 
 UK Northern Ireland 
Household composition 
Single pension age 2.7 0.0 
Single under pension age 9.4 12.8 
Couple at least one member pension age 4.2 3.8 
Couple under pension age no children  13.2 16.8 
Couple under pension age with children 9.8 8.5 
Lone parent 10.5 8.9 
Multi adult =/no children 7.9 5.0 
Mean equity value by Income Quintiles 
1 Bottom 12.6 13.0 
2 11.9 9.3 
3 11.5 8.5 
4 11.1 11.2 
5 Top 8.1 9.3 
Marital Status 
Single never married 15.5 17.5 
Married living together 8.3 8.9 
Married and separated 10.8 5.7 
Divorced 8.1 6.1 
Widowed 4.5 8.3 
Employment class 
Managerial/professional 8.9 11.2 
Intermediate 12.5 13.9 
Small Employers/ own account 11.5 10.6 
Lower supervisory/ technical 11.5 10.4 
Routine/manual 12.6 7.7 
Never worked/LT UB 5.7 8.8 
No. of Children 
Zero 10.3 12.3 
1 10.7 9.1 
2 8.7 8.5 
3+ 10.4 6.0 
No. of bedrooms 
1 17.1 17.9 
2 14.6 19.4 
3 10.1 11.2 
4+ 4.9 6.4 
Source: Family Resources Survey 
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Table 4.15: Characteristics of all mortgagors and their equity in UK and Northern 
Ireland, 2008/9 to 2010/11 (£) 
 UK Northern Ireland 
 
Negative 
equity 
Positive 
equity 
Negative 
equity 
Positive equity 
Household composition 
Single pension age 18,076  117,170  0.0 93,097 
Single under pension age 12,188  82,934  21,040  90,441  
Couple pension age 56,548 155,989 9,283 88,938 
Couple  under pension age 
no children 
15,264  102,877  21,997  96,481  
Couple under pension age 
with children 
19,077  116,822  36,429  114,257  
Lone parent 15,839  93,390  43,274  83,545  
Multi adult =/no children 29,213  134,744  68,937  126,255  
Mean equity value by Income Quintiles 
1 Bottom 27,153  104,306  72,379  94,185  
2 21,577  84,347  25,895  91,870  
3 14,723  82,258  25,003  93,333  
4 153,000  94,566  25,385  101,385  
5 Top 19,589  135,386  29,841  135,639  
Marital Status 
Single never married 12,945  73,779  21,553  70,781  
Married living together 22,155  127,912  36,670  116,805  
Married and separated 20,578  97,702  31,216  98,555  
Divorced 19,242  100,091  27,311  105,507  
Widowed 15,775  122,224  4,952  90,423  
Employment class 
Managerial/professional 18,340  106,010  31,798  123,785  
Intermediate 13,610  86,159  20,422  84,544  
Small Employers/ own 
account 
28,220  114,899  46,393 112,680  
Lower supervisory/ technical 20,218  78,876  21,401  100,486  
Routine/manual 13,513  70,897  28,942  86,616  
Never worked/LT UB 24,313 106,699 68,289  117,831  
No. of Children 
Zero 17,784 105,306  21,938  98,558  
1 17,438  107,242  45,804  112,414  
2 21,072 123,077 43,679 117,445 
3+ 18,275 136,030 33,688 114,741 
No. of bedrooms 
1 9,618 56,604 2,628 43,639 
2 13,402 65,586 17,201 58,576 
3 17,201 89,944 23,932 84,154 
4+ 40,005 191,389 61,609 152,651 
Source: Family Resources Survey 
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Other homeowners in Northern Ireland with large amounts of estimated negative equity 
were homes with four or more bedrooms (£61,609), couples with one or two children 
(£45,804 and £43,679), small employers (£46,393) and lone parents (£43,274). 
Homeowners with the lowest estimated negative equity were those in one bedroom 
properties (£2,628) - even though the incidence of negative equity among these owners 
was high - and intermediate occupations (£20,422). Couples with one member over 
pension age in the UK were carrying large amounts of negative equity (£56,548) 
although there was a wide variation that may influence the mean.  
The FRS only ask mortgagors to provide the original purchase price of their home, and 
therefore estimates of positive equity only relate to mortgagors and do not include 
outright owners. Interestingly, the estimated values of mortgagors’ positive equity did not 
differ markedly between Northern Ireland and the UK as a whole. Indeed mortgagors in 
the UK in the second, third and fourth income quintiles had lower amounts of positive 
equity than those in Northern Ireland, although those in the bottom quintile in Northern 
Ireland held lower sums of housing equity (£94,185) than their counterparts across the 
UK (£104,306). The equity held by mortgagors in the top quintile did not differ between 
the UK and Northern Ireland. Mortgagors who were in the top income quintiles, 
managerial/professional employment, multi-adult households without children and 
families and those with larger homes held the greatest amounts of housing equity, in 
Northern Ireland and across the UK. 
Further characteristics of homeowners in negative equity are shown in Table 4.16. Across 
all years homeowners who remortgaged were estimated to be almost twice as likely to be 
carrying negative equity as those who had not, and this was the same across the whole 
UK and Northern Ireland. The proportion of repayment loans in negative equity was also 
higher than the proportion of interest-only loans and again similar for Northern Ireland 
and the UK. This is interesting as interest-only loans are considered more risky, and 
arguably advanced more towards the housing market peak, but do remain the minority 
of loans. In Northern Ireland, younger cohorts of homeowners are slightly less likely to be 
affected by negative equity than in across the UK.  Homeowners who purchased property 
from 2005 onwards show the greatest propensity to be carrying negative equity. 
Table 4.16: Mortgagors in negative equity 2008/9 to 2010/11 (%) 
 UK NI 
Remortgaged 7.1 7.3 
Did not remortgage 3.9 3.9 
Age 16-34 years 3.2 2.5 
Age 35-55 years 2.8 2.8 
Age 56 years and above 1.9 1.5 
Interest only loan 4.0 3.9 
Repayment loan 5.7 5.2 
Year of purchase 2004 or before 3.4 2.7 
2005 or after 13.7 19.0 
Source: Family Resources Survey 
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Other assets 
Hellebrandt et al. (2009) suggest that homeowners may increase their savings and 
investments to compensate for the loss of housing assets. This section considers whether 
this is the case in Northern Ireland. An overview of the other assets held by Northern 
Ireland’s homeowners is provided in Table 4.17.  
Current accounts are a conduit to financial inclusion, allowing access to cost savings 
through paying bills by direct debit, for example. Only 89 per cent of homeowners in 
Northern Ireland held a current account between the periods 2008/9 to 2010/11 
compared to 97 per cent across the UK during the same period. Outright homeowners in 
Northern Ireland, who largely include older people, have even lower rates of 
participation with current accounts (86 per cent) compared to mortgagors in Northern 
Ireland, where 92 per cent hold a current account, still below the UK average.  
As in the UK, the most common forms of savings in Northern Ireland were held in ISAs (a 
tax free form of saving), building society accounts, and stocks and shares. Across the UK, 
nearly a quarter of homeowners also hold Premium Bonds but this is not apparent in 
Northern Ireland. However, a lower proportion of homeowners in Northern Ireland had 
savings in each asset class in comparison to the UK as a whole.  Furthermore, the 
proportion of homeowners in Northern Ireland holding each asset class declined across 
the housing market cycle, and this was most pronounced in the decline in building society 
accounts. Across the UK, the proportion of homeowners with building society accounts fell 
from 62 per cent to 56 per cent between the periods 2002/3 to 2004/5 and 2008/9 to 
2010/11, and for all homeowners in Northern Ireland the proportion fell from 42 per 
cent to 26 per cent during the same period. Stocks and Shares holdings fell from 26 to 20 
per cent of homeowners in the UK and from 17 per cent to 11 per cent in Northern 
Ireland. The one exception to this general decline in asset holding products, which may 
offset the decline in building society accounts, is that the proportion of homeowners who 
held ISAs in the UK increased during the housing market cycle. In the UK, the proportion 
of homeowners with ISAs rose from 37 per cent to 43 per cent. However, the rise in ISAs 
was not witnessed in Northern Ireland. The proportion of outright homeowners holding 
ISAs in Northern Ireland fell from 29 per cent to 24 per cent and for mortgagors the 
proportion holding ISAs fell from 23 per cent to 20 per cent.  
Approximately, a quarter of adults in Northern Ireland were contributing to a pension 
during 2011/12 (DSD, 2013b). Employees were more likely to contribute (48 per cent) 
than self-employed people (26 per cent). Similar figures are reported for each category in 
the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings in 2012, and these are the lowest proportions 
since 1997 (ONS). Public sector employees do contribute to pensions more often (83 per 
cent) than private sector employees (32 per cent), which may benefit Northern Ireland as 
there are greater numbers of public sector employees.  However, between 2008 and 
2010 spending on pension contributions was the lowest in Northern Ireland compared to 
England, Scotland and Wales (DETINI, 2013). Auto-enrolment of pensions began its roll-
out from 2012 so it is uncertain to what extent this situation will be reversed in the future.  
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Other assets have also suffered during the financial crisis with historically low interest 
rates and poor stock market performance, which may be an explanation for fewer 
homeowners holding assets. However, the figures do suggest that homeowners in 
Northern Ireland have not adjusted their savings behaviour to compensate for the loss of 
housing wealth.  
Conclusions 
This chapter has shown that Northern Ireland homeowners are on lower incomes, in 
more routine occupations and have made less use of interest-only loans and 
remortgaging products than those in the rest of the UK. The use of subprime loans in 
Northern Ireland has also been lower than in comparable regions in the UK.  Lower 
income homeowners did engage with remortgaging later in the housing market cycle, 
however, but less often than more affluent homeowners. Following the market downturn, 
lower income homeowners have been unable to convert interest-only loans to more 
secure repayment loans at the same rate as more affluent households. Single people, 
couples with no children, those in one or two bedroom properties and in intermediate or 
professional occupations experience negative equity most frequently in Northern Ireland 
and those in the bottom income quintile hold the greatest estimated value of negative 
equity. It does not appear that homeowners in Northern Ireland have compensated for 
the loss of housing wealth by increasing their other asset holdings. Overall, these data 
suggest a more conservative approach to household finance and towards the mortgage 
market, in particular, than across the UK. Engaging less with innovative products in the 
mortgage market may have been to Northern Ireland’s homeowners’ advantage, 
certainly in respect of remortgaging; however, a lower take up of other financial products 
is also an indicator of greater financial exclusion.  
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Source: Family Resources Survey 
Table 4.17: Proportion of homeowners holding other assets by country, housing market stage and whether home owned outright or with 
a mortgage (%) 
 
 
UK NI All homeowners NI Outright NI Mortgagors 
 
Rising Peak Falling Rising Peak Falling Rising Peak Falling Rising Peak Falling 
Current 
accounts 
96.8 96.9 97.0 90.4 88.9 88.9 85.7 84.0 86.4 93.8 93.1 91.8 
Gilts 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.2 1.4 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 
ISAs 36.9 40.0 43.3 25.5 21.5 22.2 29.1 22.0 24.4 23.0 21.2 20.0 
National 
Savings 
1.5 1.3 1.2 2.1 1.9 1.3 4.2 2.8 2.3 0.6 1.3 0.2 
BS Accounts 62.2 57.3 55.6 42.5 31.9 26.3 43.1 31.4 28.8 42.1 32.5 23.8 
PEPs 6.9 4.8 1.8 5.7 2.9 2.4 8.5 3.7 3.8 3.7 2.2 1.0 
PO Accounts 5.9 4.3 4.0 4.0 3.2 3.8 4.5 3.7 4.9 3.7 2.8 2.4 
Premium Bonds 24.0 24.4 23.1 7.3 7.3 6.3 10.5 9.0 8.4 5.0 5.9 4.1 
Save as You 
Earn 
1.1 1.0 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.8 0.0 
Share Club 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.5 
Stocks/Shares 26.1 22.1 19.5 16.6 11.6 10.6 20.2 12.8 12.5 14.0 10.8 8.6 
TESSAs 5.7 0.0 0.0 7.1 0.0 0.0 11.2 0.0 0.0 4.2 0.0 0.0 
Unit Trusts 4.3 3.8 2.8 3.1 2.3 2.1 4.5 3.0 3.3 2.2 1.6 0.9 
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5: ATTITUDES TO FALLING HOUSE PRICES 
 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the attitudes of homeowners in Northern Ireland towards the 
falling market and the use of housing equity, drawing on the qualitative interviews with a 
range of homeowners and market professionals. Although Northern Ireland has suffered 
the most extreme market adjustment of the UK since the financial crisis, the interviews 
confirmed that there was generally a moderate approach to the financialisation of the 
home, which has had, in certain respects, a protective quality for homeowners. Of 
course, some homeowners have been left exposed to significant house price falls and 
have been left financially challenged. Even for those who are otherwise sanguine about 
the house price falls, the significant negative equity in the context of a weak economy 
does leave a cohort of homeowners vulnerable to significant debt should they be unable 
to sustain homeownership; or with limited residential mobility.  
The chapter begins by looking at attitudes towards and the personal impacts of house 
price change, considers homeowners’ responses to the market fall and concludes with an 
assessment of the use of housing equity in the future. There were 51 in-depth interviews 
undertaken with homeowners, 34 of which were explicitly drawn from the bottom two 
income quintiles, and with 10 housing professionals in Northern Ireland. 
Perceptions of house price change 
Reasons for house price change 
Some people were unsure about why house prices became so volatile in Northern 
Ireland. Some cited the peace process and people returning to the region increasing 
housing demand, but the banks, estate agents, developers and greedy ‘others’ were all 
seen by the majority as culpable. A minority said that they had considered the boom 
 Interviews with Northern Ireland homeowners further demonstrated a significant 
strand of financial conservatism in the housing market, seen in the previous 
chapter. 
 Regardless of the magnitude of housing equity losses, attitudes towards the 
market downturn rested on whether homeowners prioritised the use-value or 
asset-value of their property.  
 Seeing the house as a home, rather than a financial asset to be used, offered a 
protective quality to homeowners in adverse economic circumstances. 
 Those who had incorporated their housing equity into their financial plans, or 
expectations, were the most anguished by the housing market downturn.  
 Many homeowners in negative equity had complex arrangements to overcome 
negative equity, but those with the most resources had greater opportunities to 
overcome constraints placed on their mobility, for example.  
 Other homeowners were severely hampered by their inability or unwillingness to 
sell and/or incur shortfall debts, felt financially insecure and saw limited chances 
of the situation changing in the near term. 
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unstable, but for most homeowners the housing market crash was largely unanticipated. 
While, for a majority of homeowners, the drivers of the market were external to them, 
others spoke of how they felt compelled to participate in homeownership and its 
investment potential. 
 “I always thought it wasn’t real, it didn’t feel real- over here we had low house prices 
for years” (Homeowner no.24). 
“It was driven by estate agents and the banks and builders and all that. It was people 
being greedy and forcing the prices, it was driven by them to make money and the 
solicitors and all. They all cashed in on it and they made money.” (Homeowner no.23). 
“Every time you went into the bank they were firing at you…the banks were 
encouraging you to spend money you didn’t really have- it was invisible money.” 
(Homeowner no.15). 
“Experts were saying it couldn’t last, couldn’t go on, but there was no evidence of it 
stopping and it stopped so suddenly. My parents owned property…I instilled in our 
children the view that it was good to own your own home. People wished they owned 
homes, especially in Ireland. They build their own homes on land daddy gives them 
and wouldn’t dream of renting. Sure it’s changed now.” (Homeowner no.50). 
“Wanted to have some sort of asset, just for the future. I assumed it would increase in 
value and I’d have sort of benefit there…just thought renting was dead money, it’d 
never be mine and a home would be in time.” (Homeowner no.36). 
There was a strong narrative from professionals, echoed among homeowners, of other 
people drawing down equity to fund consumption.  
“People used equity withdrawal; spend, spend, spend, a lot of the time.”  
“Anyone I came across for remortgaging was consumption spending…they rushed out 
and spent £5000 on a new kitchen and couldn’t cook any better!”  
As reflected in the FRS analysis in the previous chapter, the rate of remortgaging did 
increase during the housing market peak but Northern Ireland homeowners actually 
remortgaged less than homeowners in the rest of the UK; especially lower income 
homeowners, who remortgaged the most during the period of the falling market. 
Remortgaging was associated with an increased incidence of estimated negative equity, 
but there was limited evidence to support a relationship between equity borrowing and 
the housing market crash. This is especially so given the lower engagement with 
remortgaging products in Northern Ireland but a greater housing market downturn when 
compared to the UK.     
Market professionals said that their own views had been more cautious, noting that the 
overheated market had been unsustainable. On the one hand there was a view that 
greed and speculation had fuelled an asset bubble, and therefore any consequences of 
other people’s ‘failed’ investments were not to be lamented as it was the individuals’ 
responsibility. On the other hand an acknowledgement that the promotion of 
homeownership by governments, and indeed of the House Sales scheme by the Northern 
Ireland Housing Executive, facilitated by easy credit from the lenders and competition 
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from speculators, meant that people had felt a sense of panic at not achieving 
homeownership: ‘getting on the ladder before someone came along and pulled it up’. The 
investment potential was evident with rising capital gains. “It felt like a safe investment, 
definitely a mindset that you couldn’t lose for a while.”  The presumed ubiquity of equity 
consumption was reflected in the narratives of professionals, but housing advisors 
suggested that for lower income homeowners, this spending was limited to home 
improvements rather than consumer spending, as demonstrated in the FRS analysis in the 
previous chapter. Whether these funds were actually spent on home improvements is 
another matter, but this is a measurement error that would exist across all homeowners, 
not just those in Northern Ireland. 
The absence of previous housing market downturns in Northern Ireland was also noted 
by market professionals, which combined with the view that the legacy of political conflict 
could no longer depress the market.  
“For historical reasons we hadn’t experienced the booms and busts you [the UK] had, 
we were inexperienced, and didn’t realise there would be an inevitable downturn.” 
“When house prices started going up, there was a feeling that we were now back 
where we should have been.” 
Impacts of falling house prices 
As noted in Chapter 3, the proportion of first time buyers in the market reduced 
significantly at the market’s peak. Several market professionals noted that this squeeze 
on first time buyer activities at the peak of the market limited the adverse impact of the 
falling prices and prevented more households from entering negative equity after the 
crash. The impact of the falling prices on the market was therefore viewed as minimal. 
One market professional argued that price falls are desirable to realign house prices with 
local incomes, that further falls would be welcome, and they thought that the greatest 
impacts were felt by developers and prospective buy-to-let landlords.  
“There was a sharp up, now there’s a sharp down. Dry your eyes get over it. There are 
some that have been caught and that is very sad, but there are many that should have 
known better.”  
One lender noted the impact of the market downturn on lenders, where poor market 
practices in the region had been exposed, such as questionable valuations and poor 
conveyancing leading to defective property titles (which impedes the sale of property), as 
well as their own poor lending decisions. While lenders did not undertake regional 
analysis, they did not perceive the incidence of mortgage arrears to be worse than in 
Great Britain, not least as the proportion of their overall loan books secured on property 
in Northern Ireland is small, but the losses the lenders incurred were greater in Northern 
Ireland due to the size of negative equity. “We’ve no bespoke strategy on Northern 
Ireland; we just know we’re going to take a big hit.” Other lenders were less exposed to 
the local market, having a smaller portfolio in the region or having entered the local 
market after the market downturn. Their views, therefore, downplayed any adverse 
impacts of the falling market, in contrast to the lender with a high volume of loans in 
Northern Ireland who suspected that all lenders were affected by the fallout from the 
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crash in Northern Ireland in some way. There are possible implications for existing 
homeowners of adverse impacts on lenders, such as lower loan-to-values for 
homeowners remortgaging in the Northern Ireland market compared to in the rest of the 
UK, although this may change if the market relaxes.  
“Banks have had financial pain from Northern Ireland and changed processes in the 
UK, few banks [are] lending in NI now, few problems, it’s a genuine concern.” 
The long duration of the housing market downturn saw some sentiment towards its 
impact change. Early conversations with several market professionals held in early 2012 
downplayed the impact, but by late 2013 there appeared to be a sea change in 
responses as recognition of the “dysfunctional market skewed towards first time buyers” 
and blocked by existing homeowners unable to move on has increased.  
“Easy access to affordable homes in whatever tenure, cheaper house prices are for the 
better! I don’t think it’s a huge issue. I feel sympathy for those who over borrowed, but 
there is moral hazard and a day of reckoning.”  Spring 2012. 
“Those first time buyers today, where are their second homes going to be? …then we 
get quickly to the glass ceiling that is negative equity. Unless we have government 
intervention and lender support about how to help people in negative equity, this 
market will not function for a generation.” Winter 2013.  
The dominant response by the homeowners interviewed was also that they had not been 
affected by the fall in house prices at all, even though all of their homes had substantially 
fallen in value. These homeowners were aware of the impact of the housing market 
downturn and recession on others, but felt impervious themselves to the market 
adjustment. As Forrest et al. (1998) found in their study of negative equity in Great Britain 
in the 1990s, many homeowners interviewed for this study held strong narratives about 
other people’s circumstances - their culpability in the house price volatility and the 
subsequent impacts on people of immobility, repossession and debt - but this was not 
part of their own personal story.  
“Not affected in anyway, we weren’t looking to sell or buy a second house to rent 
out.” (Homeowner no.32) 
“No not really [had an impact] the base rate being low is a positive, but house prices 
not really. We know people who can’t sell and are in negative equity but we don’t 
need to move, even if we had a baby.” (Homeowner no.61) 
“I just feel luck that I didn’t dip into it because a lot of people did…” (Homeowner 
no.57) 
 “I know it’s an impact on those wanting to move and can’t get the price and have to 
rent. I feel ok at the minute.” (Homeowner no.56) 
For this set of homeowners, some of whom had experienced substantial gains and losses 
of housing equity and a few of which were in negative equity, they were remarkably 
sanguine about the housing market fall. Occasionally wistful about not cashing in on the 
market at its peak, they were largely ambivalent and felt untouched by the housing 
market downturn. However, many of these homeowners were in precarious financial 
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circumstances, with no savings, pensions and/or lacking secure employment, in which 
case the removal of significant assets could be important. This set of owners resisted 
feeling vulnerable as they were currently employed, had no wish to move, and had been 
in the market for some time, or had been self-builders and thus had achieved lower loan-
to-values than would be expected for their year of entry into homeownership. The 
attitudes they held towards the financial potential of their home were also significant and 
are discussed later in this chapter. 
In contrast, a minority of homeowners interviewed felt profoundly affected by the housing 
market downturn. Retirement plans were shelved, moving plans abandoned, starting 
families delayed and their sense of financial security and wellbeing had been 
undermined. Those homeowners that had actively built housing equity into their financial 
plans for the future felt the fall in house prices most acutely. This minority of interviewees 
had either actively planned to play the market, buying, selling, and trading up to 
accumulate equity, or had held more modest plans to downsize on retirement and 
release equity to support their children. They held anxieties about abandoned dreams of 
later life and their fears for their children’s futures were palpable. The gulf between their 
imagined outcomes of involvement in the housing market and the present reality caused 
them to be apprehensive about their finances.  
“I felt financially secure and I felt that I could retire early and that I would have 
enough money to live on, but now I am completely the opposite way….” (Homeowner 
no.23). 
“We always thought whenever we were going to buy it that it was going to make us 
money…whereas now if we wanted to sell it’d lose money.” (Homeowner no.58). 
“I was going to sell the house and use it for retirement, get a wee flat. But can’t do 
anything now, can’t even change the mortgage, they wouldn’t give me a better deal.” 
(Homeowner no.60). 
“What I think has replaced that sense of confidence is a feeling of vulnerability. Not 
just for people who are actually in debt, but people who see that asset diminish before 
their eyes.” (Housing Adviser). 
“I haven’t been able to pay one penny towards my daughter going to college, not a 
penny. She’s going to be up to her eyes in debt and I won’t be able to do it for the 
second one either.” (Homeowner no.23). 
For advisors the key issues were negative equity and repossessions. The interviewees 
from advice agencies identified insufficient advice and support available for homeowners 
in negative equity. If they were not in arrears or other housing stress then advice to 
resolve their particular situation, be it mobility or how to pay down the mortgage, was 
largely unavailable, although it was an issue causing great numbers of people anxiety. 
There were also calls for direct intervention, notably in the form of mortgage guarantees 
so borrowers could port their mortgages, and in effect their negative equity, to another 
property. 
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“Some sort of assistance for those not in arrears, to get the market up and running 
again. If people do need to move. There is no government assistance to facilitate them 
to do that.” (Advisor).  
“Needs a guarantee to cover the negative equity part of the loan. It would be fairly 
arrogant of the lender who contributed to, or allegedly contributed to, the negative 
equity position to demand anything off government, but I think lenders and 
government need to work together if they want this market actually moving.” (Lender).  
As claims for mortgage possessions in Northern Ireland have not declined as in the UK, 
advisors indicated that local politicians needed to review the support available to 
Northern Ireland’s homeowners. While not directly related to falling house prices, 
mortgage default in a climate of negative equity means that borrowers are likely to incur 
high shortfall debts, and as seen in Chapter 4, the magnitude of negative equity in 
Northern Ireland is greater than in the UK.   Borrowers are also less likely to be able to 
voluntarily sell their home to remedy the default situation, and are likely to remain 
unable to sell without incurring large shortfall debts for some time. And yet advisors 
highlighted the lack of initiatives such as mortgage rescue or the Preventing Repossession 
Fund that could limit the impact of possession or avoid it altogether, not least when the 
support offered by the UK government in the form of Support for Mortgage Interest has 
been curtailed and is likely to be further reduced under Universal Credit.  
Attitudes to housing equity 
Attitudes towards housing equity gains and losses were often contingent on homeowners’ 
attitudes towards the financialisation of home - the asset accumulation and opportunities 
to spend the assets stored in the home - and reinforced the point that housing markets 
are imbued with emotions and sentiment. Many were risk averse and did not seek to 
crystalise the gains made at the peak of the market, although not all people who bought 
towards the peak were explicitly risk-takers. However, existing evidence suggests that 
adopting asset-based welfare through housing equity provides income-smoothing and 
financial protection in times of need, but this was not evident among the homeowners 
interviewed. The majority of homeowners interviewed unequivocally saw their house as 
home rather than an investment to be spent, and it was this dominant view that provided 
the most comfort in the face of market adversity.  
For simplicity, the in-depth interviews suggest that homeowner attitudes to the 
financialisation of the home can be typologised as homeowners who viewed the property: 
 as a home (asserted the use-value of the property),  
 as a financial security (recognised the home was an asset over the long-term, but 
prioritised the use-value), or  
 as an investment (conscious of the asset-value of the property in the short-term 
and actively incorporated their housing assets into their financial planning).  
The strongest theme to arise from the interviews was that perceiving property as primarily 
a home and prioritising its use-value rather than asset-value and this formed a protective 
quality to homeowners in the market downturn. Despite suffering large house price falls, 
people who could sustain their mortgage payments could continue to enjoy their home 
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and did not report anxiety that their home or financial security had been threatened. 
They were still receiving the qualities or services from their home they had sought at the 
outset of their purchase.  
Moreover, interviews indicated that Northern Ireland’s homeowners, even if younger, 
were often committed to leaving the home as a bequest to their children, and so the view 
that the house was a home was intertwined with notions of family. Rowlingson (2005) 
found that younger cohorts of homeowners in Great Britain were more willing to consider 
spending the equity in the home in retirement if required, compared to older cohorts of 
homeowners who remained committed to leaving the home as a bequest to family 
members. However, in Northern Ireland, rather than the home bequest representing a 
financial resource, there was a strong expectation for some that the property would also 
remain a family home in which one of the children’s families would actually reside. This 
was particularly the case for rural homeowners who had inherited property or land on 
family farms. The thought of tapping into equity in the home was anathema to many 
homeowners regardless of age as this could jeopardise the property, which would have a 
role in the family beyond them. Some of these homeowners could barely conceptualise 
the home having any financial value let alone one that could be utilised.  
“Definitely not, no…this is our home for life and we want to have our mortgage paid 
off early in life so we can be mortgage free.” (Homeowner no.8). 
“I just want to be rid of the debt and leave my house to my two children as their 
inheritance…” (Homeowner no.1). 
“We had three children and I was just an ordinary working man, so no, we lived on a 
moderate budget you know…it’s more of an inheritance for my family, so I’m keeping 
it. I don’t really want to break into it, if you see what I mean. I am trying to keep it so 
that I can spend it amongst them.” (Homeowner no.22). 
“Once we get the big family home we’d keep it. I’d rather spend my days in it and 
pass it on. That’s how it is over here. That’s what my parents would do and what my 
grandparents would’ve done.” (Homeowner no.58). 
“We could sell it and buy…but I want it to be our home home, we’re not planning on 
selling, it’s a home home, for the next generation, when it’s their turn they can have 
it.” (Homeowner no.65). 
These narratives accord with the findings of Murphy et al. (2013) who found rural 
homeowners in the Republic of Ireland were the most conservative and less engaged in 
the exuberance of the housing market compared to city dwellers prior to the financial 
crisis.  
Another group of homeowners shared the view that the home offered a range of 
benefits, including stability, especially when associated with family meanings, but were 
conscious of the asset-value of their properties and derived a sense of security from this. 
The investment qualities of the home were less important than the housing services the 
property provided, but the asset-value also offered security. Almost two-thirds of 
homeowners could never really contemplate using housing equity for any purpose, and 
of the 14 homeowners who had used housing equity, almost exclusively for home 
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improvements, only four would consider doing so again. For those homeowners who 
considered the home as a financial security, they appreciated that they could use the 
equity if proverbially ‘anything happened’. Notably, none had done so although several 
had experienced unemployment and were currently experiencing challenges in managing 
their household budgets, during what has been the longest and deepest market 
downturn the UK has experienced.  
“Always at the back of my mind, we always had it there if you need it. I wouldn’t like 
to go down that road, if anything did happen, as you have to pay it back”. 
(Homeowner no.26). 
“It made me feel more secure and yes, it was more of an asset, but just happy that it 
was worth more than we paid for it”. (Homeowner no.20). 
A minority of homeowners had incorporated their housing equity and/or expectations of 
housing equity into their financial planning and consequently was feeling the adverse 
effects of the downturn the most. That the market had not performed as they had 
anticipated had left these homeowners feeling vulnerable or aggrieved, even if they were 
maintaining the mortgage, did not wish to move and did not have to crystalise the loss of 
equity.  
“Thought it was great, when I retire this house is going to be worth a small fortune. 
The money would help, I’m not clear, but maybe a few holidays, maybe downsize.” 
(Homeowner no.40). 
“I’m not making money, I’m losing money, and I expected to make money. I would 
never buy again, because we’ve never made any money…I feel stranded at the 
minute, if we had a realistic valuation I wouldn’t feel trapped to be here, it wouldn’t 
feel so bad.” (Homeowner 1AC). 
“The mortgage adviser made it sound so easy to get the money, but it was the worst 
thing I could’ve done…with hindsight I could’ve done without it, but they made it so 
easy. Taking money out for not much more payments, too good to be true.” 
(Homeowner 62). 
“Always been told it’s ‘safe as houses’…I know at that stage before the boom times 
[could] double your money. We didn’t envisage any risk, we just didn’t.” (Homeowner 
2AC). 
“It’s a wee bit of security, financial security in your home, but it’s not worked out like 
that.” (Homeowner no.50).  
The gap between homeowners’ expectations of the market and the current market 
position was not the only source of anxiety, however. Homeowners were also feeling the 
impact of the downturn as life plans were being thwarted as residential mobility was 
constrained. These homeowners who wished to move but could not afford to crystalise 
the shortfall debts resulting from negative equity had entered complex relationships with 
former partners, friends or with siblings who still resided in their former homes, or had let 
the properties sometimes below the cost of the mortgage, which is discussed further 
below. 
73 
Attitudes towards negative equity 
Homeowners held a range of views about negative equity, some quite ambivalent,  
 “I take the view that if you are not moving anywhere then it doesn’t really matter…so 
if you are happy where you are living, it doesn’t really matter if your house has fallen 
in price.” (Homeowner no.1). 
There was a strong narrative that even if they were unaffected by negative equity, 
homeowners interviewed were aware of the impact on others.    
“I know people who have lost out badly and some have gone bankrupt, but people 
don’t really talk about it over here- it’s just accepted that we are all in a big hole over 
here and people don’t talk about it openly- how much their house is worth or how 
badly they got stung.” (Homeowner no.57). 
“He’s [her son] only 25 and I feel bad for pushing him to buy a home. The market is a 
mess, but we never thought that this would happen. House prices have fallen so much. 
He says ‘if you never pushed me to buy, I wouldn’t be in this mess.” (Homeowner 
no.50). 
Others felt great anxiety about being in negative equity, particularly if their household 
circumstances led them to want to move. Some people had unresolved anxieties, and 
occasionally anger at the situation they found themselves in. Data analysis in the 
previous chapter demonstrated that those owners most affected by negative equity were 
those in smaller properties in early adulthood or middle age. Reflecting this, the 
interviews revealed that people had met new partners and wanted to move or wished to 
secure a home more suitable for bringing up children or to be near good schools. 
Instead, several remained in small starter homes in negative equity in areas they wanted 
to leave and with their hopes of a home as an investment unrealised. 
“I felt financial secure and I felt that I could retire early and that I would have enough 
money to live on, but now I came completely the opposite way. I am skint and I feel 
like I am going to have to work until I die and my children are going to be worse off.” 
(Homeowner no.23). 
“I’m angry in a way, it’s frustrating. I’ve got my head around it that the market is not 
going to pick up, but my husband can’t settle. I’ve got my head round being here a 
few years, and [can make] some home improvements. My husband doesn’t want to 
spend more, he doesn’t want to be here. So we have two different ideas of what is 
going on with the house.”  (Homeowner no. 75). 
“We’re stressed, friends and family, they’ve not slept, upset about it. They’re in a house 
just outside Lisburn but want to move for good schools and they can’t move because of 
negative equity. The stress is extreme, as someone has done wrong to them, the 
government, the banks. Friends all doing the same thing, there were no warning 
signs.” (Homeowner no.78). 
Responses to falling house prices 
Some people in negative equity or lacking mobility options were less constrained than 
others, often by virtue of their higher salaries, but also because by default the household 
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had come to own additional properties because of the inability to sell when new 
households were formed.  
Acquiring additional properties due to an inability to sell 
A minority of interviewees had problems relating to the ownership and maintenance of 
mortgage payments on previous property because they were unable, or often unwilling, 
to sell and incur a large shortfall debt due to negative equity. This occurred due to either 
relationship breakdown or where people had been anxious to ‘get on the property ladder’ 
and had purchased property with siblings or friends. The FRS analysis in the previous 
chapter noted that multi-adult households had some of the greatest levels of negative 
equity. People had subsequently met partners and wished to form new households, but 
could not dispose of the property without incurring debt, the other party was unable to 
afford to buy them out, or in the case of relationship breakdown, they lived precariously 
with the former partner meeting the mortgage payments until a resolution could be 
achieved. In the case of two single people coming together, the previous homes were 
sometimes rented out, although occasionally rental payments fell significantly short of the 
mortgage payments - let alone the maintenance costs - and there was a risk of having no 
monthly income to meet the mortgage on the retained home during void periods. Where 
siblings were still in residence, one homeowner was reluctant to force a sale or stop their 
mortgage payments in respect of their previous home, as the sibling would have to return 
to renting, was on a low income and, despite paying a mortgage on the current home 
too, this situation had already persisted for some years.  
Where one member of a couple had a repayment mortgage in respect of a previous 
property, as long as the mortgage payments were maintained then, through a 
combination of the debt reducing over time and a rising market, the home would 
eventually become a useful asset, despite any current negative equity. Although an 
unplanned situation, some couples had considered that this option could actually work in 
their favour in the long run. Where the loan was an interest-only mortgage then only a 
rising market could reduce the negative equity and unless the owner could afford to 
convert their mortgage to a repayment loan then interviewees suggested they just had to 
wait until the market rose sufficiently for them to sell at an acceptable price, carrying the 
burden of the additional property in the duration.  
Only one person reported that they had made enquiries with mortgage lenders to see if 
they could port their mortgage – and their negative equity- to another property but they 
were refused. Schemes such as this were available to mortgage borrowers in the 1990s 
and have emerged again in Great Britain (Lloyds Banking Group, 2012) but it is unclear 
to what extent, if at all, Northern Ireland homeowners are able to use such facilities to 
support movement within the housing market.  
 
 
Paying down debt and/or saving 
The scale of negative equity is different for people who entered the market in different 
years but some of the amounts are large and difficult for people to pay down to save 
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their way out of debt. One homeowner interviewed had negative equity of £87,000, but 
the sums among this sample of homeowners were more commonly in the tens of 
thousands. The FRS analysis in the previous chapter found a similar mean estimate of 
£35,162 for Northern Ireland homeowners, although the median was lower at £18,942.  
“I have sisters who are in negative equity – one is by £30,000 and the other by 
£70,000 – it’s a lot of money isn’t it?” (Homeowner no. 63).  
One couple in negative equity were higher earners and took an opportunity to work in 
London for a few years to save additional funds to pay down their mortgage debt and 
reduce the negative equity. In that way, they would then be able to move and start a 
family as originally planned. Another made alternative arrangements to save as they no 
longer had the cushion of housing equity to secure themselves financially.  However, 
many other homeowners were unable to convert their loans to repayment and neither 
could they afford to save, and would then be left exposed to the market for the 
foreseeable future.  
The interviews revealed that only a small minority of homeowners interviewed had 
sufficient (three months) savings to tide them over if they were to experience a break in 
their income. Another higher earner was saving more to make up for the lost investment 
in the home, but the majority view was one of overstretched finances, with rising fuel 
bills, lower incomes and therefore, an inability to make alternative financial 
arrangements.  
“We haven’t got enough savings to buy our way out to move on.” (Homeowner no.75). 
Although there was a minority of households where both partners had occupational or 
private pensions, it was commonplace for only one partner to have a pension and several 
had formerly paid into pensions in previous jobs but no longer did so. Those that did 
have some pension arrangement were uncertain if it would be adequate to ensure their 
financial security in retirement.  
Several homeowners had become more cautious in their spending as not only were their 
finances constrained by lower incomes and higher outgoings, but they were also 
conscious that the lack of housing equity meant there was nothing for them to fall back 
on. If wealth effects increase people’s propensity to spend in the wider economy, so it 
seems a reduction in wealth undermines confidence in the economy and wellbeing 
(Ratcliffe, 2010). Although it is difficult to untangle people’s vulnerability in the recession 
from the specific effects of negative equity, people had cut back on expenditure.  
The Co-Ownership scheme in Northern Ireland allows people to purchase a share in a 
property and pay rent on the remaining portion. While shared purchasers are limited in 
their accrual of equity in rising markets, they are also limited from exposure to house 
price falls. One Co-Ownership purchaser did not understand the terms of her lease and 
was concerned that she would take the full burden of negative equity should she sell, 
where in fact her negative equity was proportionately reduced in accordance with her 
share of the property. This risk reducing feature of shared ownership had not been 
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understood. Another co-owner had staircased up to full ownership at the height of the 
market in 2007 and therefore now suffered significant negative equity.  
Strategic default as a response to negative equity? 
An advice worker noted that some owners with interest-only loans and negative equity 
had been making a strategic decision to default. This was not evident in the homeowner 
interviews, but is worth highlighting as the consequences could be significant. According 
to the advice worker, homeowners had been encouraged to take on interest-only loans 
when they purchased on the basis that their careers would improve over time and they 
could convert to repayment loans after a short time. As the labour market has also been 
adversely hit by the market downturn, an increasing number of homeowners cannot 
afford to convert to a repayment loan.  
Consequently, a number of homeowners in this position were, apparently, making 
rational calculations that it would be advantageous for them to be repossessed and claim 
bankruptcy to avoid paying the large shortfall debt that would be incurred from the sale 
of the house. In the meantime, they could be renting a similar property for £200-300 a 
month less than their mortgage payments. After seven years, they would be released 
from bankruptcy and free to pursue homeownership again without the negative equity 
and the shortfall debt cleared. In contrast, it is suggested that homeowners on interest-
only loans who still could not afford a repayment loan, would be unable to repay any 
debt and in seven years could be in similar amounts of negative equity as now, with 
limited avenues to resolve the situation, and having incurred higher housing costs 
throughout the period. The advice worker suggested that this was becoming the preferred 
route by people in these circumstances, although it was unclear how widespread this 
practice was; in contrast to opting to become a landlord or voluntarily selling the 
property, which were actions reflected in the homeowner interviews. 
“If they’re on interest-only they might be paying £700 per month for the house that is 
£100K in negative equity. It’s a common scenario, but they could rent that house for 
£500 per month, but to convert to a repayment might cost £1000 per month.[They 
think] ‘I’m never going to afford to repay this mortgage so I’m going to give the house 
up’….it’s catching on as an idea, once someone has done it, others follow”.  (Advice 
Worker) 
The advice worker suggested that this approach was adopted across the board not just by 
the lowest paid, but did consider that the lower income homeowners had smaller 
amounts of negative equity than higher earners as low income owners had bought at the 
lower end of the market where the proportionate house price falls had been smaller in 
absolute terms. A mortgage lender concurred with this view that the greatest losses were 
incurred by those higher up the ‘property ladder’ or income spectrum. A large lender 
agreed, noting that ““it’s not a gilt edged book but it’s not the cheap stuff that’s in 
possession”. The analysis in the previous chapter found homeowners in the bottom 
income quintile had the highest amounts of negative equity, but may be less visible as 
they comprise a much smaller part of the market overall than middle and higher income 
homeowners. 
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The analysis of the FRS is unable to identify the extent of homeowners adopting this 
strategic default remedy to negative equity, not least as it is cross-sectional and does not 
include figures for mortgage arrears. However, individual insolvencies started to rise prior 
to the financial crisis, but have grown significantly since 2007, with a total of only 835 in 
2003, rising to 1,899 in 2006 and again to 3,189 in 2012, spread between bankruptcies, 
debt relief orders and individual voluntary arrangements2. It is unclear, however, to what 
extent negative equity has contributed to the incidence of insolvency. The interviews 
provided no other evidence that people were making strategic decisions to default on 
their mortgage. 
Commitment to homeownership 
Fewer younger cohorts are entering homeownership and thus the sector is ageing and 
contracting. This has implications for public policy in that homeownership attracts 
significantly lower housing costs in later life and lifts some people out of poverty, as well 
as satisfying household aspirations. The housing market recession in the 1990s in Great 
Britain led to a reduction in support for the tenure, which soon bounced back as the 
market improved, although there was a lag for younger households. It is unclear how the 
market and the reach of homeownership in Northern Ireland would be affected by this 
significant market adjustment. Market professionals noted the increasing affordability of 
Northern Ireland’s housing, albeit access to home buying remains constrained by larger 
mortgage deposits. Nonetheless, the housing market fall has seen greater numbers of 
first time buyers purchasing. The interviews reflected mixed views, suggesting that a few 
people had reappraised their commitment to homeownership as it had not turned out as 
they had expected, but others thought lower house prices meant that now was a good 
time to buy and would still advise young couples starting out to do so.  
Perceptions of the future 
Sentiment towards the housing market is intertwined with the effects of the downturn in 
the wider economy. Some homeowners recognised that the economy and housing 
market were not strong but felt themselves secure in their employment and were 
managing their household budgets reasonably well. However, homeowners also reflected 
concerns and were often despondent about the possibility of change coming in the near 
future.  
“There’s no money to spend. People aren’t going out, they’re afraid to spend, as the 
house prices have dropped so much. Everyday living costs have gone up and everyone 
is cautious as there’s no security in the house, like there was a few years ago. You 
can’t fall back on money.” (Homeowner no.26). 
 “But the fact that the house prices dropped and the building trade went to the 
dogs…it’s because people lost their jobs and they lost their homes…” (Homeowner 11)  
“The kids don’t get what they used to and they don’t understand why not. Everything 
has gone up, to heat the house has gone up, fuel has gone up, food has gone up and 
my wages have actually gone down well from [my] last job.” (Homeowner no.15). 
                                            
2 http://www.insolvencydirect.bis.gov.uk/otherinformation/statistics/201308/table6.pdf  
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Obviously such negative sentiments have a recursive effect on the housing market. Many 
homeowners thought the market was beginning to show some signs of recovery, but 
others did not believe there would be substantial change for some time. A section of 
people felt very vulnerable and pessimistic and others thought things could only improve.  
Conclusions 
The interviews confirmed that Northern Ireland’s homeowners adopted a more 
conservative approach to housing finance, which was shown in the survey data analysis 
in the previous chapter, with some owners unable to conceive that their home held value 
let alone that they could use the assets stored within their home. It was apparent that this 
limited the exposure of some households to the vagaries of the market and left many 
ambivalent to the market downturn. Prioritising the use-value of the home, rather than 
the asset-value, reduced anxieties at the loss of housing wealth and the security of the 
home provided a protective quality against adverse economic conditions. In contrast, a 
minority of owners, people who had bought at the peak or who explicitly viewed their 
home as a financial asset or investment, had been left in challenging circumstances. 
Higher income owners were most affected but had greater remedies available to resolve 
negative equity and any need to move. A significant cohort appear to be vulnerable to 
future shocks as they have little or no  savings or pensions and, even despite any 
reluctance to spend the home, their most significant asset has diminished in value and/or 
their access to its value has been undermined.   
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6: Conclusions 
 
 
 
Summary 
 Following a peak to trough decline in house prices of between 50-60 per cent, 
homeowners in Northern Ireland are estimated to have experienced a greater 
incidence and magnitude of negative equity than those across the UK as a 
whole.  
 Prior to the financial crisis, homeowners in Northern Ireland engaged less 
frequently with innovative products in the mortgage market – interest only loans, 
subprime loans, remortgaging - than their counterparts in the UK, but suffered a 
worse housing market crash. Homeowners’ relatively limited engagement with 
the mortgage market may, however, have been to their advantage. 
 During the longest and deepest market downturn in the post-war period, this 
study found little evidence that low-income homeowners in Northern Ireland 
used their home to smooth income and manage external shocks to their 
household finances. Nonetheless, homeownership did offer security and control 
through the market turmoil, when the use-value of the home was prioritised 
above the asset-value.  
 Although the impact of the housing market downturn was less than anticipated 
at the outset of the study, there were, nonetheless, households who had been 
adversely affected by the market fall. The ramifications of the market downturn 
on residential mobility, negative equity and mortgage arrears or possession were 
deeply felt by a minority and were viewed as critical issues by professionals. 
 Policy implications of the study in the short-term comprise using the opportunity 
afforded by the newly constituted Housing Repossessions Task Force to consider 
the extent of unsustainable homeownership in the region and identify measures 
to support local homeowners in negative equity while sharing the risks between 
all parties involved: lenders, homeowners and government.  
 In the longer term, the use-value of homeownership should be reasserted. Policy 
solutions to constrained funding based on utilising individual homeowners’ 
housing equity may be inadvisable. Housing equity is unevenly distributed 
suggesting people with more wealth or in certain locations can obtain access to 
greater services, and public policy becomes skewed by the requirements to 
support the housing market. Moreover, such measures undermine the values of 
homeownership that people value, notably security and control.  
 Nevertheless, homeowners are sitting on large sums of, largely unearned, 
housing assets that could be usefully deployed to support public policy, but could 
be equitably accessed by placing greater emphasis on the reform of land and 
housing taxation. 
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Introduction 
Following the onset of the financial crisis from 2007/8, the fall in house prices in 
Northern Ireland was profound. This study demonstrates that a greater proportion of 
homeowners in Northern Ireland were estimated to be carrying negative equity, which 
was also significantly greater in value, compared to homeowners across the UK as a 
whole. Where homeowners and market professionals had a view as to why the housing 
market had been so unstable, they cited speculation, greed, lax lending and consumption 
spending on the back of rising house prices. However, analysis of the Family Resources 
Survey, as well as the interviews with homeowners, showed that Northern Ireland’s 
homeowners adopted a more conservative approach to lending and households finances 
than their counterparts across the UK, and yet still experienced a greater housing market 
crash.  Arguably, the reasons behind the global financial crisis and the culpability of 
housing and mortgage markets will be debated for some time. However, it appears that 
Northern Ireland homeowners’ relatively limited engagement with the mortgage market 
has been to their advantage, as by resisting the financialisation of the home large 
proportions of homeowners had increased their resilience to the market fall. 
During the longest and deepest market downturn in the post-war period, this study found 
little evidence that low-income homeowners in Northern Ireland had used their home to 
smooth income and overcome income shocks, although there was an upturn in 
remortgaging activity for Northern Ireland’s homeowners during the period of the falling 
markets. The strongest story was, however, that homeownership had offered comfort to 
households through the market turbulence when the use-value of the home was 
prioritised over the asset-value of the property as an investment. No renters were 
interviewed so whether low income social renters with long term security of tenure also 
view their home as a buffer against adverse conditions is unknown, and this could 
possibly form part of future research. It could be that the data used was unable to reveal 
incidents when homeowners did use their home in this way, nonetheless, the succor 
offered by the security and control of the house purchased as a home, over the 
vulnerability in the falling market of a house purchased, wholly or in part, as an 
investment was apparent and was an approach to home finance echoed in the data 
analysis.  
Managing the impacts of the housing market downturn 
The minority of homeowners who had incorporated their home and its peak value into 
their financial plans were the most anguished by the fall in Northern Ireland’s housing 
market. Long term plans to support children’s education or retirement in the future were 
shelved and these homeowners felt financially weak as their equity cushion had been 
removed, even if they were maintaining their mortgage and had no plans to move house. 
Ambitions for those who did wish to move home to access better schools, larger 
properties or more desirable neighbourhoods were thwarted for several homeowners and 
there was a sense that their lives were on hold until they could resolve how best to move 
on and/or extricate themselves from part ownership of their previous homes. The spectre 
of shortfall debts should they default on their mortgage was also a concern for a 
minority. Although the loss of housing wealth was less of an issue for homeowners than 
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anticipated at the outset of the study, the ramifications of the market downturn on 
residential mobility – not least for existing homeowners; the large sums of negative equity 
carried by many homeowners and the stubbornly high level of mortgage possessions 
were critical issues for many, including market professionals who felt there were limited 
tools and advice to provide for homeowners in these adverse circumstances. 
It is clear that residential mortgage possessions in Northern Ireland, or certainly the 
readily quantifiable claims made in the local court service for possession on the grounds 
of mortgage arrears, are not declining as they have done across the UK as a whole. 
Existing evidence notes the dislocation experienced by households, including children, 
who face losing their home making it an important policy concern, not least as a rise in 
the Bank of England base rates is, at the time of writing, unlikely to be deferred for much 
longer. Further data and information is required to determine the exact circumstances 
and scale of the problem, perhaps with the support of lenders.  
The funding of the Mortgage Debt Advisory Service has been effective in providing advice 
to struggling homeowners and there has been little drop off in the homeowners seeking 
its services, but there are fewer remedies available to advisors and lenders in Northern 
Ireland than currently exists across other jurisdictions of the UK, but the persistence of 
mortgage default through the downturn and the scale of negative equity force a re-
examination of local policy. The establishment of a new Housing Repossessions Taskforce 
Northern Ireland announced by the Minister for Social Development Nelson McCausland 
in February 2014 is, therefore, a welcome opportunity to consider policy responses to 
support struggling homeowners. The Taskforce represents an opportunity to understand 
more about the risks of unsustainable homeownership in Northern Ireland, revisit 
debates about mortgage rescue type schemes, and consider ways in which existing 
homeowners who need to move and can afford to do so are supported.  
There is a need to improve the local evidence base by examining:  
 the extent of the risk of mortgage default,  
 the balance and impact of buy-to-let and residential possessions within the 
existing data (although buy-to-let mortgage default also has consequences for the 
local housing market and tenants), 
 the circumstances of struggling homeowners,  
 the incidence of negative equity among homeowners (and among those at risk of 
default), and  
 the support required to prevent or mitigate the impact of possessions.  
There may be a range of tools to consider such as:  
 the provision of short-term relief when financial shocks have been temporary (not 
least to overcome deficiencies if the waiting period for Support for Mortgage 
Interest is changed to 39 weeks and/or weakened under Universal Credit);  
 mechanisms to engage borrowers with their lenders’ forbearance policies and 
limit the adverse impacts on vulnerable families in sustainable circumstances, by 
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widely communicating the support available, reducing their share of the property 
by converting to an affordable rent or an equity share arrangement; or  
 consider how partnership arrangements can share the risks and costs of such 
initiatives between lenders, homeowners and government. There are precedents 
here with the UK Government’s New Buy guarantee where lenders, builders and 
government underwrite equity loans for home purchase (Stephens and Williams, 
2012) and the negotiated write-offs of shortfall debts incurred when 
homeownership was exited in negative equity (Wilcox et al., 2010; Wallace et al., 
2011).   
The housing market stabilised during 2013, but there is likely to be a ‘long tail’ of issues 
arising from the market crash. There was evidence of blockages in the local housing 
market arising from negative equity that limits mobility among existing homeowners, 
unless they incur complex arrangements of renting; part owning property in which they 
no longer reside; or selling and crystalising their loss. There were calls for the Taskforce 
to also consider steps that could facilitate existing homeowners to port their mortgages, 
perhaps by offering guarantees on loan-to-values above a certain threshold. This would 
enable homeowners with sustainable loans to move within the market and reduce the 
risks that lenders would limit their investment in the region. Again consideration should 
be given to sharing the risks and costs of such guarantees among lenders, government 
and homeowners.  
How can housing assets be used to support households? 
Returning to the loss of housing wealth over the long term and homeowners’ reticence in 
spending the home there are two things to consider. Firstly, the evidence presented here 
suggests that promoting the use of housing assets may undermine the very values that 
provide security to homeowners in adverse conditions. The use-value of homeownership 
should therefore be reasserted, and policy responses to funding shortfalls should avoid 
solutions that rest on individual homeowners’ housing equity. Although the financial 
conservatism of Northern Ireland homeowners was evident, more widely emphasising the 
housing services obtained from a home over the potential for equity gains is possibly not 
an easy idea to reverse, now that the potential for asset-accumulation and the mortgage 
market enabling of equity withdrawal in situ are firmly established parts of the UK 
housing market. The fresh mortgage market regulation from April 2014 and macro 
measures discussed by the Bank of England may take some heat out of any future rising 
markets, but it is uncertain how homeowners’ (or lenders’) sentiment will respond. What 
proportions of people will remain hesitant to engage with home equity in the future, 
especially in any future exuberant markets? Secondly, and perhaps in opposition to the 
above statement, some homeowners sit on significant sums of housing equity that in a 
period of state retrenchment could be used to effectively overcome weaknesses in savings 
and pensions behaviour and the public provision of services. However, existing evidence 
suggests shifts towards property-based asset based welfare meaning that those without 
housing assets lose out – a particular concern if fewer people are able to achieve 
homeownership in the future - and also that public policy gets skewed towards 
supporting the housing market (Doling and Ronald, 2010). Squaring this circle provokes 
a reconsideration of land and housing taxation that could equitably access these, mostly 
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unearned, housing assets and deploy them to support social safety nets, as well as 
moderate unbalanced housing markets (Stephens and Williams, 2013).  
Reforming housing taxation would present an opportunity to limit instability in the 
housing market, move some way towards overcoming wealth inequalities, limit 
affordability pressures in the market fuelled by expectations of capital gains, make the 
occupation and distribution of housing as a scarce resource more efficient and create a 
more level playing field in terms of tenure choices (Crawshaw, 2009). Current property 
taxation, notably the exemption from main residences from capital gains tax, fails to 
capture windfall gains made during property transactions and is estimated to cost the 
Treasury between £5.1 billion to £6.5 billion a year in 2007/8 (ibid.). Current property 
taxation through council tax, inheritance tax or stamp duty land tax are either highly 
regressive, as the more affluent pay a disproportionately low share of their wealth and/or 
income; only serve a small portion of estates; or are inefficient, causing prices blockages 
and dampening mobility in the market. There are many proposals for encompassing 
reform of housing and land taxation aimed to both reflect the value held in housing, 
property or land and more equitable methods of capturing it that include:  
 combining property taxes that reflect wealth with local income taxes to ensure 
receipts are tied to owners’ ability to pay;  
 shifting inheritance based tax from a donor-based tax to a recipient-based tax;  
 land value taxes to capture the value of the land on which property sits;  
 greater taxation of second and empty homes; increasing the number of bands at 
the top and bottom ends of council tax;  
 removing the ‘slab’ system associated with stamp duty, where once over the value 
threshold the whole sum is taxed at the higher rate; or  
 abolishing stamp duty altogether in favour of reforming capital gains taxes on 
main residences (Leishman et al., 2014; Hills et al., 2013; Crawshaw, 2009); 
Northern Ireland does not of course have a local council tax and local rates are based on 
recent re-valuations of local property. Nor does Northern Ireland have extensive tax 
raising abilities or the power to reform taxes independently. Nonetheless, discussions are 
required across the UK regarding how to utilise the value of housing assets without 
jeopardising individual homeowners’ security. 
Poverty and homeownership 
Another issue raised by the study is that homeowners can be poor as well as renters. 
Most homes will, certainly in the long run as mortgage debt is paid down, have accrued 
housing equity and yet low income homeowners are largely disinclined to risk their home 
by accessing this wealth even if mortgage markets would permit. Therefore, anti-poverty 
strategies should consider how to support homeowners, including those with children as 
one third of children who live in poverty households live in homes headed by a 
homeowner. This may have implications for area-based initiatives that may fail to include 
low-income homeowner households, although even former Executive estates are through 
the House Sales programme now likely to be mixed tenure. This may also prompt 
consideration of the support offered through the social security system as mentioned 
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above. Currently support with housing costs is much more limited to owners than renters, 
and is this situation is likely to continue under Universal Credit proposals. Moreover, a 
significant proportion of poorer homeowners are retired and the minimal housing costs 
associated with a completed mortgage reduces the incidence of poverty later in life 
(Tunstall et al., 2013). This is a significant advantage of homeownership, but should not 
be pursued unsustainability and this study, as well as Boyle’s (2008) study of the potential 
for equity release in later life in Northern Ireland, demonstrates the reluctance of local 
people to engage with these types of products. Another consideration for future public 
support for an ageing population is what it might mean for low income households’ 
housing costs in later life if fewer people enter homeownership? 
Conclusion 
The study suggests that housing wealth is not a short cut towards increasing lower 
income households’ resilience to adverse economic shock, although, in the context of 
offering security and control homeownership may be beneficial. It is beyond this study to 
confirm how the experiences of the homeowners reported here may or may not differ 
from renters with long term security of tenure, or to homeowners’ experiences in other 
parts of the UK with different market experiences and/or cultural values.  What can be 
said is that a more conservative approach to finance paid psychological dividends to 
homeowners in a turbulent market period. The study suggested that the behavioural and 
attitudinal responses of homeowners to rising and falling home equity are as important 
factors to include in policy making, as quantifiable estimates of aggregate housing 
wealth. Overall, it was not the financial value of the assets stored in the home that could 
be drawn upon in times of need that offered homeowners support, but the succor gained 
from enjoying the use-value, security and control their home offered. Although promoting 
the asset-value of homeownership increased homeowners’ perceived or actual 
vulnerability to market shocks, for many homeowners the investment qualities of property 
comprised part of their motivations to own a home, and so culturally, it may be a difficult 
view to reverse. These were the people who felt the greatest impact from the loss of 
housing wealth and for whom policy should look to foster a degree of support.  
The study implies a limit to the value of asset-based welfare policies in increasing 
households’ resilience to economic shocks, certainly those based on the potential of 
housing wealth. The potential risk involved from spending the home for lower income 
owners, meant that the sustainability of the home is jeopardised for the present owners 
and their families, and undermines the attributes of home that people value –security, 
control and the opportunity to leave home as a bequest. It is, therefore, difficult for 
housing policy alone to overcome the weaknesses in other aspects of modern economies, 
such as the labour market and the provision of effective social security safety nets across 
the life course and across tenure. In the short-term, promoting savings behaviour and 
limiting volatility in housing markets may be beneficial. Over the long-term, despite a 
lack of appetite among the public and politicians for reform, land and housing taxation 
may contribute further to social goals and provide funds to support households to 
manage in uncertain conditions. The evidence here suggests that such moves should be 
explored further as an effective way to deploy housing assets as a resource.   
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APPENDIX 1: TOPIC GUIDE HOMEOWNERS 
Introduction 
Thank you for agreeing to help with the project.  
- Restate aims of project and where they fit in. 
- Confidentiality and consent 
- Confirm ability to withdraw from interview without consequence at any time 
- Length of interview (aim for 40 minutes) 
- Permission to record interview 
Background 
Before we discuss your experiences of the house price falls in the region, can I just quickly 
run through some basic information? This will help us make sense of what you tell us 
later on.  
1. Age group? (from address/consent form)  
2. Region? (from address/consent form) East/West/Belfast  
3. House sales/Co-ownership? (from address/consent form)  
4. Household type? (couple with 3 children; single etc)  
5. Employment status: working full/part time; unemployed; long 
term ill-health; retired (for both partners if couple)  
 
6.  What type of employment sector? Retail, warehouse, factory, 
call centre, council, health service etc. (for both partners if 
couple) 
 
7. Do you receive any benefits? If so which ones?  
8. Type of property? (2 bed terrace, 3 bed semi etc)  
9. It would be helpful for us to know something about when and 
how you purchased your home.  
 
a. When did you buy your house?  
b. How much did you buy your house for?   
c. How much is it currently worth (roughly)?  
d. Still got a mortgage/loan secured on property (from 
form)? 
 
e. If still got mortgage. How much did you have to 
borrow to purchase the property?  
 
f. What is roughly the amount of mortgage outstanding 
now? (note if involved remortgaging)  
 
g. Who is/was  your lender or lenders?  
h. Are/were there any other loans secured on the 
property? How much do you owe those lenders? 
 
10. Can I just ask quickly about other financial products? 
Do you have any forms of savings? Are they enough to cover 
you in an emergency? i.e   Would they cover three months 
salary or unexpected bills?  
 
11. Do you have /or do you pay into a pension? What kind? 
Private final salary, state only etc. Is/ will it be sufficient for 
you to get by?  
 
12. Do/did you have any other types of unsecured debt like loans 
or credit cards? How much do you owe, roughly?   
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13. Have you ever received an inheritance (in the form of a 
property or money from the sale of a property?  a) How much 
roughly and when? b) Do you expect to inherit anything in the 
future? 
 
14. Any other financial products not mentioned?  
 
Expectations of homeownership? 
1. How did you arrive at the decision to buy a home? What particular qualities 
attracted you to homeownership?  (security, monthly costs, control, rising markets, 
decorate it, equity, better home or neighbourhood etc) Prompt for meanings of 
things they put forward, examples. 
2. Did you ever consider renting? Briefly explore reasons either way. 
3. At the time of the purchase, how important to you was the opportunity to 
accumulate equity in your property? Why? If important, how did they see 
themselves benefiting from the equity?  
Expectations of house prices in general 
4. Thinking back to before the recession, what did you think when house prices really 
started to take off?  
5. Why do you think house prices went up so much?  
6. Did house price rises change the way people behaved? (consumption, BTL, 
credit/loans, remortgaging, FTBs?) 
Attitudes towards and experiences of using housing equity 
7. Casting your mind back a bit, did you think about your home being worth a lot 
more? Did that have any effect on your own behaviour?   
8. Was there anything you did because your home was worth more, anything you 
didn’t think you were in a position to do before?  
a. Have you ever remortgaged, or used equity? What did you use this money 
for?  How many times? to give to family member, fund purchases, repay 
debts, support you when you lost work, needed additional funds in home, 
repairs? Get examples, details of how they acted on rising equity  
9. Was there anything you planned to do because your home was worth more? e.g. 
anything you didn’t think you could afford to do before? Retirement planning, go 
to college, pass money on to family, have a holiday, pay off debts etc. 
10. Did the rising equity change the way the way you felt about your home, life or 
your finances?  If so, in what way? E.g. sense of security etc. 
Recession and falling prices 
11. Thinking more broadly than housing, the recession has gone on for some time 
now. Can you tell me how it’s affected you? Or your family? Prompt for job 
security, loss of confidence, rising prices, lower wages, debts, mortgage arrears?  
12. So after 2006/7 as house prices have fallen and continue to fall. How have 
people been affected?   
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13. Has the fall in house price meant people have changed their plans or altered their 
behaviour or expectations at all? Now or for the future? Prompt to talk generally 
about situation before talking about whether same for them. 
14. Earlier you indicated that your home had fallen in value. How has the fall in house 
prices affected you?  
a. Has the fall in house values stopped you doing or planning to do 
something in the future? Affected mobility, retirement planning, debt 
consolidation, plans to pass to children, plans for their home? 
If negative equity: 
a. I notice that you (along with many others) are in negative equity? How do 
you view this? 
b. Has negative equity stopped you doing or planning to do something (refer 
to earlier thoughts)?  If so, how, get examples.  Moving, drawing on equity, 
debts , repairs? 
c. What are or might be the consequences for you not being able to draw on 
any equity for some time?  
15. Did the fall in house prices and housing equity change the way the way you felt 
about your home, life or your finances? If so, in what way?  
Future plans 
16. What do you think will happen to house prices in the future? What might be the 
long term implications, if any, of this fall in house prices? If prices bounce back? If 
price remain much lower? 
17. Have your views on owning a home changed at all since you made your first 
purchase? Why? What things have become more or less important?  
18. Anything else that you’d like the researchers to know about how the fall in house 
prices has affected people in your position in Northern Ireland? 
Would it be ok if we contact you again next year to see how you are getting on and if 
anything has changed?  
THANK YOU FOR GIVING ME YOUR TIME. CONFIRM NAME AND ADDRESS AND 
REASSURE WE’LL SEND VOUCHER 
 
